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PRESENTATION  
The project “Visions of the European Research Area” (VERA) was set up to provide relevant strategic 
intelligence for the future governance and priority-setting of the European research and innovation 
system. Since the beginning, it was conceived to have a dual focus: a geographic focus on European-
level research and innovation activities; and a political focus interested in the governance of these 
activities. Therefore, the central movement we consider is on-going shifts in the European research and 
innovation system of both the activities themselves, policy definition and implementation around specific 
priorities and the modes (and degrees) of Europeanisation. The assumption is that the European Union 
has been and is generating a unique situation worldwide dealing both with research and innovation 
activities and policies whereby the creation of a “European Research Area” has been used to qualify 
both the future world aimed at and the transformation processes towards this new world (Hooghe & 
Marks 2001; Majone 2009, Edler et al. Behrens 2003; Borrás 2004). 
With this in mind, WP1 carried out an in-depth stocktaking of research and innovation system forward 
looking activities in Europe and internationally. WP2 delivered a thorough review of trends and drivers of 
long-term change of European research and innovation systems and governance, and WP3, on the 
basis of these insights, endeavoured to develop four scenarios describing potential evolutions of the 
European research and innovation system . WP4 focused on making explicit the critical issues for the 
ERA’s future capabilities emerging from these scenarios, and explored subsequent issues for policy 
discussion today. 
In this framework, we developed the backcasting exercise in three steps from the scenarios: a) explore 
their implications for the research and innovation landscapes (extended/lensed scenarios); b) from this 
extension/lensed view, we derived a set of 55 policy and institutional features (see supra); and c) based 
on these features, we identified key policy issues, features that are present in more than one scenario 
reflecting issues that emerge as key in very different social and political contexts. As a result, we 
identified three types of policy issues: a) institutional issues, b) framework conditions’ issues, and c) 
direct interventions’ issues. 
This document builds the second part of WP4 of the VERA project. Its ambition is to ‘backcast’ from the 
2030 scenarios to elicit the policy / governance questions they raise for research and innovation policies 
at the European level. In order to do so we had to make a methodological development, which we 
labelled as a ‘policy lensing approach’ expressing scenarios in terms relevant for policy discussion. The 
ambition of such an approach is to identify the changes in the key governance features and policy 
priorities. This drove to a comparative analysis of scenarios and to a synthesis of what we consider the 
key questions raised that policymakers should consider when discussing institutional changes at the 
European level.  
A companion document presenting the full methodology has been produced and presented at the FTA 
conference. It is attached to this report but is also available as an autonomous article on the website of 
the FTA conference. The first step of the methodology has been to develop ‘research and innovation 
landscapes’ in 2030 corresponding to each scenario. Applying this framework in a systematic way for 
each scenario enables us to characterise scenarios along dimensions that correspond to the ways 
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policies are being discussed, evidence is being framed and implementation structures being developed 
and operated. The framework has two dimensions: one deals with the overarching policy priorities for 
research and innovation policies organised along three main lines as they have been since the 1960s: 
developing a friendly environment to support innovation at the firm level, developing the science base, 
and addressing Government / collective / societal missions. The second dimension deals with the ways 
in which research and innovation policies are defined and implemented combining two elements: policy 
functions (orientation, programming, performance), and the mode of Europeanisation (federalised, 
integrated, coordinated and juxtaposed) for each of the policy functions.  
Each landscape is 5-6 pages. These developments have enabled to identify 55 key features (between 
12 and 15 per scenario) that are presented at the end of each scenario. This background material is 
presented in part II of this document. Table 1 synthetises this process.  
Part I presents the comparative analysis we have made (mostly a table – table 2 - comparing the 4 
scenarios along the lines set out) and the synthesis we have derived by looking at policy issues shared 
by at least two scenarios, even if the reason why they share the issue and the direction proposed differ. 
In one word, this process helps us to identify key current policy problems that these scenarios help us 
identify.  
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PART 1 - Issues for policy discussion in view of the 4 scenarios 
We start by a synthetic view comparing the 4 scenarios in term of institutional arrangements at the 
European level. We first consider the three functions underlined by Barré (2013) and changes expected 
in the orientation layer (how are priorities defined), at the programming layer (with 4 questions: 
existence of an encompassing FP or not, sectorialisation of RDI activities, main mode of EU activities for 
societal challenges and – an outcome from our inquiry – specific role of communication programmes). 
We then address the performance level with two main aspects: the role of large firms, and the S&T base 
(considering the role of PROs and the orientation of universities). One of the results of the 
characterisation of the R&I landscape at the horizon 2030 has been to highlight the importance of the 
innovation ecology in most scenarios but with very different orientations: we address these around 4 
aspects: IP, standards, procurement policies and start-up ecology.  
The table shows how much scenarios differ in most lines, some scenarios (especially 2 and 4) being 
nearer to one another. This table serves as a background to the overall synthesis we propose about the 
questions the 4 scenarios raise. Our analysis distinguishes three main types of policy issues: 
institutional, framework conditions, and direct interventions. We define and address these in turn and we 
conclude with a consideration of several assumptions that underlie most current policy practice and 
which are questioned under several of our scenarios and thus emerge as topics for policy discussion. 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 3 Scenario 2 Scenario 4 
Orientation layer No change in the 
way MS negotiate 
priorities – focus is 
on compromise 
between national 
executives 
S&T policy is no 
longer an objet of 
negotiation – ERA 
as driving 
compromise 
making has 
disappeared 
Radically changed 
institutional 
process for 
defining societal 
challenges – 
central role of 
parliament (with 
new procedures to 
interact with 
national 
parliaments) 
Crisis drive 
alignment – no 
need for change 
at the orientation 
layer 
Programming 
layer 
    
Existence of an 
encompassing FP 
NO  NO YES 
Encompassing FP 
(large increase in 
resources 
compared to 
H2020) 
NO 
Sectorialisation of 
RDI activities 
YES (with 
constrained 
overall EU budget, 
at best in line with 
present H2020) 
YES (but remain 
marginal overall) 
NO YES (rather 
important) 
Main modes of EU PPP with large None as such – Large Multiple targeted 
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activities for 
societal 
challenges 
firms on those 
challenges that 
may generate 
economic activity 
 
All other 
challenges are 
‘orphan’ and taken 
care of by CSO 
only 
intermediation 
activities between 
local initiatives 
programmes the 
ESA way, with 
similar coverage 
of downstream 
aspects, key role 
of ‘real size 
experiments’ 
(driving to multi-
level 
arrangements) 
programmes in all 
departments of 
the EC addressing 
all aspects of life 
styles, mixing 
technology and 
social 
developments, 
focused on 
experiments 
where local 
environments play 
a large role (both 
cities, regions and 
CSO) 
Specific role of 
communication 
programmes 
YES (mostly 
driven by the 
circulation of 
goods) 
YES (mainly 
focused on 
internet platforms) 
YES (as one of 
the societal 
challenge – the 
internet society) 
YES (mostly 
driven by the need 
to reduce carbon 
footprint) 
S&T base – 
respective role of 
PRO and 
orientation of 
Universities 
Focused on 
excellence / 
strong EU 
agencies for 
breakthrough S&T 
/ vast 
differentiation – 
hierarchisation of 
universities 
Not a EU level 
priority anymore 
(mostly handled at 
regional/local level 
with a large 
variety of 
approaches) 
Key role of PRO 
as solution 
integrators (may 
witness domain-
base EU 
consolidation). 
Universities well 
off with a large 
spread of activities 
(linked one way or 
the other to the 
variety of 
challenges) 
 
Idem for PRO as 
in scenario 2 
But very different 
for universities – 
changing balance 
between fields 
and changing 
equilibrium 
between 
excellence and 
relevance 
Role of large firms Central (represent 
80% of world 
industrial R&D) / 
are in the driving 
seat with ppp 
Not an issue 
(again may be 
critical in some 
local 
environments) 
Present as a key 
actor, sharing with 
CSO  
More in a solution 
provider role 
under control of 
programmes 
Innovation ecology     
IP Integrated system 
with integrated 
enforcement 
system to better 
protect firms 
Not decisive Multiple 
innovations in the 
ways to channel 
IP as an incentive 
to invest in the 
right sectors / 
public research 
adopts open 
Multiple 
innovations in the 
ways to channel 
IP as an incentive 
to invest in the 
right sectors / 
public research 
adopts open 
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framework framework 
standards Support the 
international 
shaping of 
markets in a 
favourable way for 
firms 
Important to 
promote values 
shared 
transversally 
(thanks to 
platforms) / strong 
regulatory activity 
(the REACH way) 
Key instrument in 
developing 
incentives towards 
products that meet 
the challenges 
Key instrument in 
developing 
incentives towards 
products that 
foster adaptation 
Procurement 
policies 
Provide initial 
markets and early 
references to 
innovative 
products 
No common 
framework at EU 
level any longer 
Idem as for 
standards  
Idem as for 
standards 
Start-up ecology NTBF seen as a 
demonstrator of 
new 
developments 
(acquisitions the 
main mode, some 
rare case of new 
large firms) – 
covers the whole 
range of activities 
(incubator, seed & 
venture capital, 
adequate IPO 
market) with 
EU/state 
guarantees about 
risk taking 
No framework at 
EU level, 
important variety 
between regions 
Present / not 
central / more 
focus on 
adaptation 
capabilities of 
existing SME 
Present / not 
central / more 
focus on 
adaptation 
capabilities of 
existing SME 
 
The different scenarios represent different problem perceptions, different forms of dominant policy 
action, and different roles for the European institutions. Our scenarios highlight profound differences in 
the political and social priorities that underpin the way in which problems are defined. Such differences 
result in varying understandings of the role of science and technology in society, and of the institutions 
involved in generating and applying new knowledge. It is important, therefore to think twice, to question 
our current assumptions on the context, drivers and objectives of research policies. Despite the diversity 
of the scenarios, there are some issues emerging in more than one scenario; that is, issues that are 
important in very different economic, social and political contexts. To act wisely current policy design 
should address these key issues.  
The scenarios let us also anticipate that the institutional context under which European research and 
innovation policy will be defined and implemented within two decades is likely to be substantially 
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different from the situation we are experiencing today. Yet, to a large extent, our current decisions will 
shape such context; what we are doing today opens and closes options for the future.  
In this regard, a major value-added of the VERA policy-lensing approach lies in the opening up of policy 
spaces, of choices and their potential consequences in the different political and societal contexts as 
defined by the scenarios. This is complementary to the outcome of the VERA stakeholder debate, a 
systematic synopsis of stakeholder views on the future of the European research and innovation 
system, informing the current discussion about priorities for the European Research Area (ERA) (see 
VERA WP5). 
1. Think twice 
The scenarios illustrate how future societies may regard the role of science and technology in diverse, 
even divergent, ways. The role of science in society is evolving and several directions of changes are 
open. Therefore, some of our implicit or explicit assumptions underpinning current science, technology 
and innovation policy may prove, in the long term, inadequate. We revisit these assumptions, 
recognizing that we face policy choices that are profoundly political, rather than  a consensual ground 
towards which societies will necessarily converge. 
1.1. The role of European institutions 
Often, in policy discussions, the institutional architecture of the EU is taken for granted. But, as the 
scenarios show us, this situation can change. We cannot assume that there is a natural evolution 
towards, for instance, European-wide institutions. The role of the European Union and its institutions 
differs across scenarios. In Scenario 1 public sector institutions are generally weak and fragmented, 
national authorities have struggled to retain a degree of influence over the political process and of 
control over economic resources, and the EU institutions have seen their remit limited to setting 
regulatory structures and other framework conditions. Scenarios 2 and 4 present a very different 
situation. In them, the EU and its institutions have become a key player, growing in size and legitimacy, 
and taking over responsibilities that currently are the remit of national and regional authorities. Yet, the 
political configuration of the EU institutions will depend on the political context. In scenario 2, European 
societies come together to deal with policy problems whose solution exceeds the capacity of any single 
State. This transfer of authority to supranational organisations comes accompanied by the development 
of instruments of democratic oversight at European level: a strong European Parliament provides the 
source of democratic legitimacy. In scenario 4 the EU and its institutions are also playing a key role but 
there is a focus on a single set of problems leading to a less diversified political environment. Finally, 
scenario 3 is dominated by local and regional interests, and the role of the EU institutions is limited to 
that of a facilitator, supporting policy learning and information sharing across policy and scientific 
communities.  
What is the future role we envisage for European institutions? The evolution of the ERA, and of the role 
of the EU in an evolving European research and innovation system can take differing paths, and such 
paths are associated with the development of different European governance structures. The balance 
among the policy levels is subject to big uncertainties: The regional level is, together with the local, the 
central locus of science, technology, and innovation policy in scenario 3, and it is also important for the 
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experimentation and eventual deployment of innovations in scenario 4. European institutions are 
dominant in scenario 2 and national governments have retained a degree of influence and relevance 
against the general retrenchment of the State in scenario 1. There is therefore a choice among different 
institutional architectures and this choice is not neutral in relation to political objectives. For instance, a 
strong role for European institutions fits with a scenario in which national authorities have agreed to 
pursue a variety of societal goals requiring international coordination, but cannot be sustained by a 
scenario characterised by budgetary restriction in the public sector and a focus on private firms as the 
engine of competitiveness and economic growth. 
1.2. A single ERA or a common, yet diverse and open area 
It is an implicit assumption of most European policies, that a “common area” will, and should, deliver a 
single and integrated European research and innovation system. This, the argument goes, is a 
precondition for more efficient and effective research systems. Free mobility of resources in a single 
integrated system is the best way to allocate resources, as in any other “market”. In many scenarios, 
however, system integration is replaced by different forms of connectedness. Often the scenarios focus 
on policy approaches that fit with local conditions and in the development of capacities that can deal 
with the local and regional qualities of more general social challenges (like for instance in Scenario 3). 
The nurturing of local capacities and their fit with the local contexts and needs is unlikely to be served by 
an unrestrained focus on objectives that do not take this diversity into consideration. The policy 
challenge for today lies in balancing the development of both, a research area that is inclusive of and 
relevant to all European regions and the support for research capabilities allowing Europe to become a 
hub in global knowledge networks. 
1.3. The pursuit of excellence 
One of the beliefs at the centre of many current policies is that the promotion of “excellence” should be 
the natural overriding objective of research policy. Clearly, it is difficult to argue against excellence. Yet, 
except for Scenario 1, the highly selective ethos of this approach is not present in any of the other 
scenarios. Instead, the concern with systemic effects and the application of research to address societal 
problems are the overriding concern in two of the scenarios. Therefore, the policy challenge we are 
facing in 2015 is how to balance this pursuit of scientific excellence with the other functions of research 
organizations that make them, for instance, relevant to their local and regional contexts. 
From a higher education perspective, many of the current practices (from funding mechanisms to the 
popularity of some ranking systems) are based on the implicit assumption that universities should aspire 
to excellence by improving their research capacity and outputs. Yet again, the role of universities varied 
across scenarios. This is a reflection of the increasingly different functions that universities play in our 
societies. Scenario 3 for instance focuses on the local role of universities and their teaching function. 
The policy challenge we are now facing is how to help Higher Education find a proper balance among its 
different functions. 
1.4. The role of science in supporting social progress and welfare is undisputed 
It is a widely shared belief among policymakers and stakeholders that ‘science’ plays a crucial role in 
modern societies. Modern technology and the improvements in the human condition it has made 
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possible could not have taken place without the knowledge generated by scientific research. Yet the 
societal attitudes towards the various sciences (natural, technical, social) are far from homogenous, and 
the scenarios illustrate situations where scientific goals are considered secondary to other social 
objectives. In scenario 1, science is purely seen in an instrumental way rather than an activity that is 
valuable in itself. Scenario 3 presents an environment that is more concerned in harnessing current 
capabilities for welfare than in supporting scientific research. In all scenarios academic science is only 
one element among diversifying modes and actors of knowledge production and innovation. The current 
policy challenge is to define how European policies can help in the experimentation and establishment 
of flexible but robust modes of distributed knowledge production. 
 
2. Some areas for action (but act wisely) 
Reconsidering our assumptions can modify the way in which we define policies, but there are specific 
policy areas that need attention, in all circumstances. In our scenario analysis, when an issue appeared 
in more than one scenario we consider it a warning sign of the existence of a policy problem that would 
be relevant in very different contexts. An important (and somewhat unexpected) outcome of this 
analysis is the importance that framework conditions (such as intellectual property rights, standards, 
regulatory activity focused on public procurement) and communication infrastructures have in most 
scenarios.  
Framework conditions play an important role, but they do so in very different ways depending on the 
scenario. IPR, for instance, is prominent in scenario 1 as a condition for greater competitiveness of 
firms, and this scenario foresees the achievement of a full system covering ‘one stop shop’ for granting 
patents and a European-level enforcement system. In contrast, scenarios 2 and 4 are characterised by 
large public investments to address societal problems and here IP policies seek to ensure that the 
results of such research are publicly available. There are similar differences for standards: they serve 
the opening of markets for firms in scenario 1, while they are an instrument to reduce the environmental 
impact of goods and services in scenario 4. Similar differences in focus apply for regulations 
surrounding procurement policies.  
Although these issues are often seen as a purely technical matter, the scenarios alert us to their 
importance and to their profoundly political nature. In other words, the framework conditions posed by 
IPR regulations, standards, and procurement regulations are in need of further development, which will 
be aligned with specific political objectives.  
Another theme calling for both regulatory and direct intervention is the need to develop a 
comprehensive and efficient communications infrastructure, both in terms of physical transport and 
internet-based telecommunications. The transfer of physical goods is anticipated to be a central concern 
when the position of Europe in global supply networks is of paramount importance (scenario 1), 
whereas the notion of what can pass for an “efficient” mode of communication will rely more heavily on 
telecommunications and internet infrastructures in the remaining scenarios.  
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There are additional interventions noted in our scenarios, but these are unique to each kind of scenario. 
The pursuit of economic competitiveness in scenario 1 focuses the limited budgets available for public 
research on the conduct of frontier research and technology. In this scenario investments are to be 
carried out in partnership with the private sector; the spread of Public-Private Partnerships in research 
and technological development will require a redefinition of the competition rules, as private investors 
will seek assurances that their R&D investments will be rewarded through guaranteed access to 
sufficient markets for the resulting products and services. When the driving focus is on addressing 
societal problems (scenarios 2 and 4), research programmes are system-oriented; that is, they see the 
application of new knowledge within a complex social system as one of the main challenges of 
research. This requires special attention to be paid to experimentation, real size demonstrators and 
“bottom-up” stakeholder participation. 
 
3. Anticipate institutional change 
All scenarios anticipate shifts in the institutional architecture underpinning research and innovation 
policies. First, the importance of agencies will grow. Agencies are semi-autonomous public sector 
organisations that contract for a service with a government organisation. They are ad-hoc structures to 
implement specific policies and are designed specifically for the purpose for which they have been 
created. European agencies are already present in today’s ERA strategies; the management of 
research programmes is being transferred to specialised agencies like the European Research Council 
Executive Agency and the Research Executive Agency. So far, their role has been instrumental, offering 
a way of carrying out policy implementation tasks without drawing on European Commission 
functionaries. Our scenarios describe a broader and differentiated view of agencies: they deal with 
specialized activities, but can also be a flexible tool to implement policies at the local and regional levels 
accounting for the specific local context of application. The flexibility that can be afforded by national 
and regional agencies fits an environment where the main policy lines and objectives are set at 
European level, but national and sub-national actors play key programming and performing functions. 
This will lead to a proliferation of smaller agencies with limited geographical scope with the EU helping 
in their coordination, further developing current instruments like ERA-Nets, Joint Programming 
Initiatives, and Article 185 initiatives. 
We also anticipate the growth in the research arena of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs: foundations, 
NGOs, learned societies, university associations, etc.). CSOs are gaining influence within the policy 
processes and becoming an avenue of quasi-democratic representation. They are proposing research 
directions and starting to contribute to the programming and even performance of research. CSOs will 
become a central set of actors to add to government institutions and private sector firms. Yet, our 
scenarios caution us that the functions they will perform are not predetermined and can evolve into 
different directions. Private philanthropic organisations can cover some of the gaps left by the reduction 
in public sector interventions (scenario 1), can form part of a broader collection of public and private 
bodies performing research (scenario 2) or can complement the research programming and performing 
roles of the public sector (scenario 4). CSOs are going to be engaged in more direct and operational 
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ways than merely being the interlocutors in a diffuse “dialogue with society” and this will require changes 
in policy practice. 
 
4. Challenge your assumptions 
The VERA analysis reveals that the landscape of actors and institutions of European research and 
innovation will change in the coming decade, and quite likely it will become more complex. Policymakers 
today need to anticipate such changes and to reflect about the assumptions underlying present-day 
research and innovation policies (ERA and otherwise). Dimensions, concepts and approaches currently 
taken for granted can rapidly become irrelevant. 
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Part II - The Research and Innovation landscapes and key features of the scenarios 
though the policy-lensing process 
Scenario 1 - Private knowledge – Global markets 
Step 1 – Policy Priorities 
In this scenario, economic growth (seen mostly as revolving around private sector investment) is the 
main force driving policy design and implementation. The world is increasingly globalised and thus 
competitiveness is the central motive driving policies both at European, national and regional levels in 
Europe. The focus on economic competitiveness and growth has become even more pressing given 
that Europe has been slow to get out of the crisis and that the need for budgetary restraint is still a major 
constraint for most national and regional public authorities. Consequently, the private firm becomes the 
main locus for research and innovation. Research and Innovation policy focuses on supporting the 
innovation capabilities of private firms. At the European level this means ‘framing’ an environment that 
supports innovation in the firms. The development of the science base become subordinate to this main 
objective: a strong science base is seen as a way, even a requirement, to enhance the breakthrough 
capabilities of large firms (that are all global and represent the core of world industrial R&D1) and to 
nurture a rich and lively ecology of ‘new technology based firms’2. Similarly the dominant way to address 
societal issues is through public private partnerships that can harness the capacity of the private sector 
to address social challenges through the creation of new products and services, and the generation of 
new new business models..  
Supporting innovation at the firm level 
The focus in this scenario is on the creation of a friendly environment for innovation at the firm. A crucial 
element of this environment is the existence of common European rules: IP, standards, innovation-
based procurement, shared approaches to support for “new technology based firms”. All these 
“intangible” dimensions are complemented by a tangible one: the communication infrastructures that link 
and articulate the European market, thus helping mobilise Researh, Development and Innovation efforts 
at European level, and support the economic exploitation of its results. All other classical ‘market 
failures’ interventions – for a strategic sector or for supporting SME – remain ‘national’ or ‘regional’. The 
following paragraphs develop these points. 
Europe has been able to develop a common innovation ecology based on common shared rules and 
practices. A  key feature of it is a completely integrated approach to IP and patenting: a single 
application will cover the whole of European countries thanks to an integrated process associating all 
existing offices (multiple options are possible), but also through a specific enforcement structure (in 
particular with the development of a European Patent court). Common European practices have also 
                                                     
1
 The 200 largest R&D spending firms represent half of world industrial R&D and the first 2000 over 80% 
(source: IPTS scoreboard). 
2
 We use this term rather than start-up firms (many are not technological) and spin-off firms (many do not 
come out of universities) 
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developed for (i) standardisation with European standards bodies becoming dominant vis-à-vis a minor 
role for national offices and a unified participation into international standardisation offices); and (ii) 
public procurement with public sector markets open to European-wide competition thanks to more 
encompassing directives effectively translated into national legislation and practice, and a shared 
definition of entities considered as ‘public’. 
A second dimension of the friendly environment for private sector innovation is the existence of an 
efficient and comprehensive European communication infrastructure.  This extends to both physical 
transport and telecommunications. There has been long-standing work to explain the role these 
infrastructures play in the competitiveness of firms. Private firms have been key in setting and operate 
up this infrastructure supported by public sector investment and regulation, including substantial R&D 
expenditures, which have been used to support a strong technological base in communications and a 
sound regulatory environment. Understood in this broad sense, “communications” will have become the 
main beneficiary of public R&D expenditure at European level.. The resulting infrastructure articulates a 
space that represents 40% of the world market, with the existence of strong firms both in equipment and 
operation.  
Other public interventions will target ‘market failures’ and the local support of small / mid-sized firms. 
The latter will remain national or regional adapted to local problems and being therefore very varied in 
their volume, modalities and direction  
Societal missions 
The possibilities to implement the lasting discourse on the need to orient research and innovation to the 
solution of societal problems remain heavily constrained by the limited financial means at the disposal of 
Governments.  Organised actors, other than government organisations have come to play a central role 
in the launch of research initiatives to address societal problems. There are three main types of 
organisations behind the funding and implementation of such initiatives:  
 ‘collective experiments’ bringing together interest groups, local associations, and at 
times, local government developing new approaches to fund and organise R&D 
initiatives, placing very limited demands on the public funding system; 
 philanthropic organisations, some of them very large and of international scope ( 
following the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation “model”);  
 ‘public private partnerships’, where public authorities co-invest with large firms with 
the view that the solutions developed will generate new market opportunities.  
 
In one word, reflecting the budgetary situation, Government plays a very limited role in the choice of 
problems to be addressed and the definition of priorities. Following this logic, at European level, 
research funds available through the European institutions have remained constrained. The European 
institutions continue to develop and implement research and innovation policies to address societal 
problems, but the instruments used seek to stimulate and coordinate the contributions of other actors. 
This will entail more ‘à la carte’ participation and a de facto layered Europe.   
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When looking at the different challenges being discussed today (2014) we see two of them as having 
been taken up at European level in a significant way:  
1. Energy transition continues to be a research priority, supported through PPP. Special 
attention is being paid to energy production (including decentralised production 
technologies) and transport. Other fields of research like low energy consuming 
equipment and devices are being driven by different actors and through mechanisms 
similar to today’s Forestry stewardship council. This will also apply to a range of 
products associated with climate change and the search for lower carbon footprints; 
mostly supported by concerned citizen’s groups.  
2. Health issues, remain important mostly those associated with ageing and lifestyle 
(obesity, diabetes…). This is a field with scope for PPP articulated through 
instruments like new JPIs mostly focused on the development of new treatments 
(drugs, vaccines…). These are societal problems that offer also potential for firms to 
generate profits: co-investment between the public sector and large firms has 
become very common practice3.  
 
Firms are active in these two areas, as they constitute important and growing markets. Other societal 
missions, offering lesser scope for the generation of commercial profits have remained the remit of 
collective experiments or philanthropic organisations, and are not the subject of large coordination 
between governments.  
Science base 
The core motivation for investing in the science base is to support competitiveness and economic 
growth. Excellent science is important for these goals, but is concentrated in a few large leading 
research organisations (mainly universities) offering an able counterpart to large firms. These strong 
scientific research nodes are very important for both supporting the long-term research of large firms 
and for nurturing a lively ecology of new technology based firms. They thrive at the frontier of science 
and technology and have access to the substantial funds necessary to support such research. They 
receive substantial private funding, but also public support. As overall public resources to support 
scientific research remain stagnated, the backing of such centres of excellence means a concentration 
of research funding and a reinforcement of funding at the European level for responsive frontier 
science and technology.  
Two important outcomes of this scenario are (i) a stronger concentration around key science ‘clusters’ 
in Europe, and (ii) a greater dualisation of Universities, with a vast majority of universities focusing on 
professional/vocational education (with probably a greater role of life long learning) and a small group of 
                                                     
3
 This may happen under a new form of PPP where large firms co-invest in initial stages of developments and 
the creation of start-up firms, against a priority to buy them at a later stage. Such developments are clearly 
linked to a reinforcing of the oligopolisation of the pharmaceutical industry, and the ability to retain large 
European players 
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research-led elite universities. The former are oriented to serve local actors and the local industry, 
whereas the latter act as global actors in global knowledge markets.  
Step 2 – Europeanisation mode 
What governance is implied by this priority on competitiveness? We consider the three policy functions 
in turn and within them we focus on what happens at the European level and how. In a nutshell, this 
scenario does not involve any major change in the ways priorities are set and political compromises built 
at the European level. There is however a breaking up of the overarching approach to implementation 
(the Framework programme-type of intervention no longer exists) and a ‘sectorialisation’ of research & 
innovation interventions. The different DGs are in charge of developing and implementing their R&I 
policies (on the US model). “Horizontal” activities like the support for basic research and the 
implementation of IP policy is carried out by powerful autonomous agencies. The limited funding 
capacity of the public sector is counter-balanced by the rising role of NGO and philanthropic 
organisations that, even though often very specialised (e.g. on an orphan disease), collectively cover a 
wide range of domains.  
The following paragraphs elaborate this state of affairs for each policy function. 
The orientation function at the European level does not attempt to cover the whole spectrum of 
research and innovation activities; instead it focuses on institutional aspects linked to competitiveness 
and the development of a friendly innovation-ecology (IP, standards, rules for procurement). This 
represents a clear change from today’s core debates on policy orientation with its focus on the 
resources and priorities given to the common R&D support programme (for many year called 
Framework programme). The programming function has also changed significantly, with this common, 
all-encompassing programme disappearing, and R&I interventions being developed and implemented 
by the different DGs in a “sectorialised” context. Only some horizontal activities, like the support of basic 
research are conducted by agencies.  These agencies have been reinforced and have gained 
autonomy. Two important agencies have witnessed substantial transformation: 
 An agency in charge of the development and implementation of all IP policies; integrating a single 
European patenting office, trademark office, and all activities related to the protection of other Intellectual 
Property Rights. An EU-level enforcement system is in fact being implemented through this single 
agency.  
 A single agency, following on the steps of the European Research Council, will be responsible for the 
support of basic research at European level.  
 
Within this context, some of the core policies in the current EU innovation policy landscape have 
undergone important changes. First, the support of SME’s innovation capabilities remains high in the 
agenda but given the budgetary constraints, interventions are channelled either through sectorial 
policies or through dwindling structural funds. The outcome is a diversity of instruments, many of limited 
size and targeted to specific sectors or activities. Such fragmentation compounds the difficulties that 
SMEs face to follow these instruments and access the limited funding available.   
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Second, the role of “societal challenges” as a major dimension of current European discourse has all but 
disappeared. “Societal challenges” must be distinguished from the pursuit of government missions, as 
understood by the OECD terminology. The terminology of societal challenge warrants the recognition of 
an important problem that cannot be handled with the usual departmental processes and means. 
Specific ways of defining the problem, the new knowledge required to address it and the ways to 
conduct the efforts have to be identified and put in action and involve a variety of actors (different 
ministries and agencies, different scientific disciplines, many social groups and stakeholders). Thus, a 
policy to address a “societal challenge” goes beyond ‘business as usual’. In the current scenario, 
Governments have limited means to address them and the sectorialisation of European policy (in part 
triggered by squabbles over dwindling funds) means that coordinated inter-departmental approaches 
can no longer be implemented. The importance of such broad societal challenges continues and is still 
recognised, but policy discourse has transferred the responsibility to tackle them to “bottom-up” 
initiatives coordinating different societal stakeholders. It is the “new society” that organises itself to 
address societal problems without relying on bureaucratic State organizations. It is the co-investment of 
societal actors – both in defining the directions and shaping the ways to address them - that is expected 
to be sufficient to address the societal challenges. In so doing, three groups of actors play a central role: 
large firms with capabilities to invest on long-term R&D entering public-private partnerships to address 
societal problems and creating new markets on the way; ‘concerned groups’ (to follow Callon’s 
terminology) mostly organised by NGO with clear foci (e.g. a given disease) and looking for solutions to 
it; and targeted groups of public authorities, including national governments that consider an issue so 
important (in political terms) that they need to address it. Although the rethoric is compelling, 
orchestrating and coordinating such a diversity of groups within a context that is driven by private actors 
following growth strategies, means that very few ‘challenges’ have been addressed by such co-
investment initiatives. Instruments such as JPI have survived over the decades but are used sparingly. 
When they do, the operationalization of such bottom-up, broadly based, international initiatives have 
mostly relied on joint programmes articulating funding agencies in an ERA Net-like fashion with NGOs, 
and large private firms. Inter-governmental co-operation has thus become an important element when 
addressing societal challenges and the EC role, when it exists, is limited to that of ‘another member’ 
rather than an overseeing and orchestrating member. Instead, the role of NGOs as become important in 
pushing issues to be considered “societal challenges” and bringing together different actors in a flexible 
and constantly changing architecture.  
NGOs role has also become more important in fields like sustainable fishing or forestry through their 
contribution to stewardship councils. In this scenario, they have also replaced the role of Governments 
in standard-setting, and are playing a central role in the implementation of strong certification policies, at 
times embedded in enlarged ISO processes (as is being the case today for the 26000 series on social 
responsibility).  
Concerning the performance function, the role of the public sector has also seen a marked reduction 
when compared to todays’ (2014). Universities are the key feature of the public sector in this scenario. 
These have undergone increasing differentiation, with ‘excellent science and technologies’ being 
concentrated in a small number of universities. Around these leading universities, a rich ecology of new 
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technology/science based firms and of research centres of large firms has developed. In contrast to 
these few, leading universities and their surrounding “ecosystem”, the majority of universities address 
the regional  needs for skilled and knowledgeable workforce. The vast majority of universities are 
therefore teaching-led and focus on professional/vocational education. They do undertake research 
activities, but these will mostly be problem-driven and oriented towards helping local economic actors. 
This type of research will seldom be frontier research, but rather will seek to adapt and further develop 
knowledge to provide solutions to well-defined technical problems.  
 
 
  
SCENARIO 1 – KEY FEATURES 
Policy priorities 
1- Development of a common, integrated Europe-wide Intellectual Property system including a 
European patent system. 
2- European standards. Increasing the role and scope of European standardization bodies (CEN, 
CENELEC,…) vis-à-vis national bodies (DIN, BSO,…)  
3- Enforce public procurement regulations opening national, regional and local procurement to 
European competition across sectors 
4- Development of strong European-wide communication infrastructures (both physical 
transport and ICT), including R&D funding. 
5- Supporting scientific research in a reduced number of outstanding research universities, 
through European funding agencies like the European Research Council. 
Institutional foci 
6- Development of Public-Private Partnerships tools to implement European STI policies. These 
involve large firms and address areas with market potential (e.g. Energy transitions and ageing) 
(implemented in the scenario). 
7- Important “programming” role of private philanthropic organizations. 
8- Agencies in charge of specific aspects of STI (like the European Research Council) are 
powerful within their areas of activity and operate with autonomy. 
9- STI support policies are fragmented and implemented across all types of European 
institutions. 
Other implications of the scenario 
10- Concentration of scientific and technological capabilities around key science ‘clusters’ in 
Europe. 
11- Dualisation of Universities, with a vast majority focusing on professional education 
(including life-long learning) and a small group of research-led elite universities. 
12- Public sector STI support is limited and fragmented. Diversity of instruments, many of 
limited size and targeted to specific sectors or activities.  
13- Support to SME’s innovation capabilities remains high in the agenda but given the 
budgetary constraints, interventions are channelled either through sectorial policies or through 
dwindling structural funds. 
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Scenario 2 – Societal challenges – Joint action 
Step 1 – Policy Priorities 
Two central dimensions explain the thrust of this scenario: (i) The global economy recovered from the 
crisis in the late 00s and early 10s, and Governments are no longer subject to strict budgetary 
constraints that characterised the early part of the Century. Therefore, they are able to invest substantial 
resources to address “grand societal challenges”. European Governments consider that an environment 
that supports innovation is a necessary condition to address these challenges. (ii) A political choice has 
been made to address these challenges collectively at European level. European initiatives are no 
longer the result of ad-hoc political compromises, but the outcome of pro-active choices that are shaping 
a new institutional setting at European level (see step 2 for its description).  
We thus witness the emergence of a set of ‘large’ programmes to address societal challenges (we keep 
the old OECD wording to highlight their importance in the overall allocation of resources even though 
they widely differ in their origins, contents and management). They co-exist with active work at the 
European level on the development of an environment that is supportive to innovation. Compared to 
Scenario 1, there are important differences in the way this environment is conceived. In scenario 1 the 
focus was on developing a context that would support and provide incentives to private firms to engage 
in innovative activities; this included measures that facilitate the private exploitation of research results, 
and provide a “safe” context for firms to profit from investments in research and innovation. In Scenario 
2, innovation is viewed in a broader sense to include “social innovations” and changes in the public 
provision of goods and services. As public funding of research is substantial, there is an active focus on 
open access to research results. Public investments in basic research, and higher education are a high 
priority and draw substantial funds. Also the resources available to the public sector enable active 
support measures to SMEs in all sectors of the economy.    
The following paragraphs detail this scenario, starting with societal challenges, following by support to 
innovation activities and by policies on the science base. 
Societal missions 
The choice for a collective approach to identified societal challenges has driven to the emergence of a 
set of new ‘large’ programmes at the European level, that constitute the core of public investments for 
R&I in Europe.  
We use the terminology ‘large’ coming from OECD language from the 1970s because these 
programmes share a number of features with the case of space research in Europe: countries have 
succeeded in gathering their resources on a long-term basis, there is an overarching international 
agency in charge of conducting activities with a shared governance structure, and pluri-annual 
programmes are decided on the basis of a large consultation, based on competences and a will to 
distribute capabilities among participant countries (there is an allocation process that guarantees that all 
countries benefit from the activities developed). Finally, and this is a key change compared to the 
philosophy of European research programmes prevailing at the time of writing, European collaborative 
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programmes do not stop at the research level, but go ‘down’ to the development and test and 
experimentation of global solutions.  
The selection of challenges that these programmes address is the outcome of a democratic process (as 
we explain in step 2). Their coverage is encompassing  dealing with challenges that require different 
levels of investment, scope, duration and size. They are developed at European level, based on a 
pooling of resources. Resources available for these programmes are greater than the funds that had 
been available to address societal challenges under, for instance, Horizon 2020. In addition, other civil 
society organizations (like NGO and philanthropic associations) contribute both to the funding and the 
performance of these programmes; these organizations provide legitimation to the ‘challenge’ and play 
a role in the programming and performance through their substantial capabilities. A consequence of this 
is that we witness a variety of ways though which programmes come to being and a variety of 
‘implementation structures’: agencies, foundations, etc. However they share in common that there is a 
central governance at European level.  
Supporting innovation at the firm level 
There is a common understanding that supporting innovation in firms was an important element in 
driving Europe out of the early XXIth Century crisis. It is thus considered that strong, innovative firms are 
a prerequisite enabling the European Union to address societal challenges. Yet, there is also an 
understanding that the public sector plays an important role in funding and performing innovation, as 
well as steering R&I policy towards societal goals that transcend mere economic growth objectives. 
Some of the elements mentioned in Scenario 1 as key components of support to the innovative firm are 
also present here. For instance, the focus on communication infrastructures (both in term of priority and 
of implementation through integrated structures and agencies), and the support to the innovative 
capabilities of SMEs. Differently from Scenario 1, some of this support is channelled as part of wider 
programmes to address societal challenges and is therefore channelled through European 
organisations. The Programmes are larger and more coordinated than in Scenario 1, and benefit from 
substantial indirect support through enlarged structural funds.  
A common, European IP policy is also a major building block of an environment that is supportive, not 
only of innovation at the firm, but of innovation in society at large. This is another important difference 
with Scenario 1: there is a single framework for IP policy at European level, but its goal is to ensure that 
the result of public investment can revert to society at large rather than being “privatised” by specific 
agents. The IP system organizes public open access to the results of publicly-funded research. 
Although, like in Scenario 1, the system also strives to provide a safe environment for private firms to be 
able to enjoy the results of their investment in Research and Innovation, its main objective is to ensure 
that societal goals can be addressed efficiently and that private actors cannot stand in the way of 
socially efficient exploitation of the results of publicly funded research. This is done by an organizational 
structure alike to the one we have described for Scenario 1 (a single European agency dealing with 
different aspects of IP regulation), but following different strategies. IP policy is just one of the elements 
of a broader set of strategies to use of standardisation and regulation to shape the direction of 
innovation to be more responsive to societal priorities. Areas like standardisation have become a more 
open, increasing the number of active players to include NGOs and other concerned stakeholders. 
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Standardisation is not only a tool to regulate markets, but a policy instrument that can be used to 
support innovation in a “socially responsible” and sustainable manner.  In this scenario the public sector 
plays a key role as a funder, and to an extent also performer of research activities. Yet the private sector 
remains an important actor, and private firms receive more public funds to support their innovative 
activities than in Scenario 1. This investment has grown overtime and has enabled public investors to 
spread the coverage of activities to a variety of sectors, including labour-intensive services like the 
leisure and tourism industries.  
The scenario is also characterised by a high degree of tax harmonisation at European level. As Europe 
struggle to emerge from the economic crisis of the early XXIst Century,  measures were successfully 
implemented to avoid tax avoidance and tax optimisation; particularly by large, multinational firms. An 
aspect of tax harmonisation that directly concerns research and innovation policies is tax credits for 
R&D investments. These have progressively been harmonised at European level and focused on small 
firms.  
The science base 
In a far easier financial situation, both member states and the EC can implement ambitious research 
and educational agendas to raise the scientific and technological capabilities of their societies. For 
countries this means that both core and competitive funding have increased providing for a regular 
increase in activities, manpower and opportunities for researcher careers. Contrary to scenario 1, there 
has not been pressure towards a hierarchisation of universities. The regional and distributional 
implications of a model that concentrates “excellence” in a few poles are perceived as a problem to be 
addressed by policies seeking an even distribution of scientific and technological capacities. In practice, 
the availability of public funds has enabled many universities being in a position to have at least one 
discipline in which they excel. Thus public capabilities are more distributed even if clusters of 
“excellence” remain.  
At the European level, the pursuit of frontier science and breakthrough technology continues to be a 
public sector priority, but this is explicitly and directly connected to addressing societal challenges. New 
specific programmes to develop major technologies are in place, as well as programmes to support 
basic research in areas considered relevant for the societal challenges being addressed  (“strategically 
targeted fundamental research). These policies are implemented by European agencies (like the 
European Research Agency) providing a scientific counterpart to the technology and innovation-oriented 
programmes. The connections they can establish by operating at the same European level, enable 
European research agencies to pursue  targeted research programmes addressing the knowledge base 
of societal challenges. 
The links between basic research and the societal challenges have placed European actors at the 
centre of research policy definition and implementation. Grand societal challenges require concerted 
European response, and research policy is seen as supporting this response. Although public funds are 
available it has become difficult for national and regional governments to develop their own, 
independent research policies, and they rather reproduce at a lower scale the priorities and instruments 
defined at European level.  
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Step 2 – Europeanisation mode 
This scenario witnesses a profound transformation of the orientation function. A new institutional 
framework is in place for the identification and selection of challenges; that is, those issues that require 
that Europe invests specific resources on them. This new institutional framework is there to get away 
from the ad-hoc compromises made at executive level (the council), and rests upon open processes of 
legitimation under the aegis of the European Parliament. The new institutional framework provides a 
European space where organised groups able to operate at European level can push their agendas, 
and build European societal platforms (on the model of European Technology platforms) to gather 
momentum and organise policy advocacy. Processes at the level of elected representatives (in the vein 
of the US hearings or processes) have developed in the European Parliament and become an important 
source for defining and selecting the “grand societal challenges” that the EU will address. The role of the 
executive (and in particular the European Council and its arm, the European Commission) is central for 
the allocation of resources and the structuring of implementation structures. One key feature, as 
opposed to Scenario 1, is the persistence of an encompassing programme for research and innovation 
along the lines of the Framework Programme and Horizon 2020. These programmes combine the 
support to the science base and the European-level funding of ‘large’ programmes. As one cannot 
anticipate the list of programmes over a 7-year span, the political decision has been to create within the 
new Programme a fund for societal challenges whose allocation is progressively decided as challenges 
unfold.  
This institutional feature makes the transition with the programming layer. This is dominated by the set 
of large European programmes that have arisen from the political process mentioned above. The central 
instrument for putting them in action, and thus translating goals into organised action comes from the 
implementation work carried out by European institutions and agencies. As in the orientation function, 
there are instruments and practices (advisory bodies, expert groups, seconded experts, formal working 
groups, informal contacts) that allow interest groups and stakeholders (in particular large NGOs and 
philanthropic associations able to operate at international level) to provide an input into the definition 
and implementation of European interventions. This programming process occurs in parallel with the 
construction of implementation structures to conduct the large programmes. Scenario 2 is characterized 
by a large number of agencies enabling a greater professionalization away from bureaucratic 
constraints, and a better fit to each individual situation. Multiple solutions have flourished for such 
implementation structures, including periodic delegation to existing agencies and the creation of 
foundations at the European level that enable more easily the blending of financial resources from 
different sources.  
Because of the size of its investments, and because of the European-level legitimation process, the 
European Commission plays a central role and is often the architect of such constructions. The 
agencification movement is also prevalent at European level and thus there is a clear separation 
between ‘programming’ and operation.  
The performance function is driven by the availability of resources. Universities thus fare far better than 
two decades before, and are not subject to a sharp hierarchisation like in Scenario 1. As much funding 
is organised at European level and is competitive in nature, there is a process of differentiations with a 
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number of research-intensive universities (between 100 and 200 over the whole of Europe) playing an 
active role in European programmes and initiatives. There remains a more limited number of 
“excellence centres”, hubs where a variety of large firms, research centres and top research universities 
covering almost the whole range of research disciplines are brought together. Yet, there is not a chasm 
between these universities and the rest: a lager number of research universities (the 100-200 mentioned 
above) have also developed pockets of excellence and expertise in specific fields, and have developed 
their own ecosystems of local partners and collaborators. Even those universities without a clear 
research profile have thrived by supporting the needs of the knowledge-based society through 
advanced teaching and limited, teaching-linked, research and consultancy activities oriented to local 
needs.  
One original aspect of this scenario deals with the nature of large programmes and their search for 
developing and testing global solutions. This gives a special role for Public Research Organizations as 
solution integrators (e.g. for new water management solutions) and as key actors in developing and 
maintaining the corresponding research infrastructures (e.g. Alzheimer databases or clinical testing 
facilities). This may drive to international mergers or at least lasting strategic alliances with shared 
institutes or facilities.  
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SCENARIO 2 – KEY FEATURES 
  
Policy priorities 
1- Addressing a considerable and growing set of societal “challenges” and problems through public 
support to R&D activities. 
2- Support to basic research in areas considered relevant to societal challenges (“strategically 
targeted fundamental research”). 
3- Development of a common, integrated Europe-wide Intellectual Property system including a 
European patent system focusing on ensuring open access to the results of publicly funded research. 
4- Opening up European standardization to more societal players including NGOs and other 
concerned stakeholders. Standardisation is seen as an instrument to support innovation in a “socially 
responsible” and sustainable manner. 
5- Development of strong European-wide communication infrastructures (both physical transport 
and ICT). This includes the funding of R&D programmes to develop new communication technologies. 
6- Tax harmonisation at European level including common treatment of tax credits for R&D 
investments, focusing mainly on small firms. 
Institutional foci 
7- Policy orientation rests upon open processes of legitimation under the aegis of the European 
Parliament. 
8- European Commission and other European bodies are at the core of policy programming. 
9- New political processes for legitimizing and agenda-setting of societal challenges have increased 
the influence of organised groups able to operate at European level. These are able to push their 
agendas, and build European societal platforms (on the model of European Technology platforms).  
10- A wide variety of organisations (including national and regional public sector organisations, NGOs 
and philanthropic organisations) participate actively in the performance function.  
11- Public Research Organizations become solution integrators and key actors in developing and 
maintaining research infrastructures. Some PROs have merged across borders or entered into 
international strategic alliances. 
Other implications of the scenario 
12- IP governance focuses on different objectives than Scenario 1. While in Scenario 1 the main 
objective is to provide security for private investors and open the market to international 
competition, the main objectives in Scenario 2 are to ensure open access to the outputs of public 
R&D investments, and provide a regulatory common ground that contributes to tackling global 
challenges. 
13- Problem-driven orientation permeates the definition of science policy priorities and the 
evaluation of its results 
14- Innovation is viewed broadly to include “social innovation” and changes in the public provision 
of goods and services. 
15- Substantial scientific and technological capabilities are dispersed across the majority of European 
regions. Universities are not subjected to sharp hierarchisation. 
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Scenario 3 – Solutions apart – Local is beautiful 
Step 1 – Policy Priorities 
Scenario 3 is characterised by the very deep mistrust toward top-down centrally decided and high 
technology based solutions. The scenario emerges from a failure of government policies and EU 
policies to deal with a long-lasting economic crisis stretching well over a decade and other societal 
challenges. The EU and its institutions played an important role in devising EU-wide policies and 
coordinating national governments; the failure to deal with the crisis discredited established political 
parties and the EU institutions.  The political culture that emerged as a response placed the emphasis 
on changing lifestyles rather than seeking new technology-based solutions to existing problems. This 
means that solutions revolve around the way in which citizens organize and live their lives, focusing on 
“soft” solutions related, for instance, to the design of cities, the deployment of “light” transport solutions 
(eg, electric trams without heavy infrastructures…), public health and preventive medicine, local small-
scale energy production based on sustainable sources, and food production and distribution systems 
favouring local sources. In fact most of the technologies on which this scenario is based are already 
available today.  
This drives to a complete redefinition of the ‘need for Europe’ (and indeed, in large countries, the ‘need 
for nations’). National and European policies deal with the conditions that transcend the local context 
and ‘frame’ the possibilities of local variety. Thus European-level intervention is restricted to coping with 
common infrastructures and the fora and platforms that foster exchange and learning, and act as a 
source of bottom-up based alliances between regions or cities on shared issues. There is thus a drastic 
reduction of the scope of European-level activities whatever policy dimension is concerned. This fits with 
the budgetary constraints public authorities (at all levels) face. To address public problems societies 
have to go beyond what governments can offer and seek new sources of funding, extending from the 
traditional recourse to NGOs to the use of newer tools like crowd funding).  
A final key feature of this scenario is the way in which Europe at large and its components consider their 
world positioning. An analogy is that of Switzerland within Europe: having its own agenda, reluctant to 
intervene in any matter that is not of direct concern, and only developing ad-hoc relations when judged 
useful. In this approach European countries and regions focus on their own endowments, and take 
advantage of the fact others have different views and different ways of addressing issues (e.g. riding on 
the Asian tech wave, behaving as intelligent users, rather than willing to be producers of everything). In 
this scenario, Europe focuses on its local competitive advantages, and is increasingly viewed and 
valued as being a nice place to go, where to spend time and may be to retire (remember that Phoenix is 
a lively place built on retired people!). 
This localised and distributed approach drives us to question the our analysis of policy priorities along 
the three dimensions. We however use them to deepen the key features just highlighted. 
Societal missions 
The notion of grand challenges (as defined previously) does not exist any longer. There are societal 
issues that are discussed at the global level but that are only addressed ‘locally’ even when considered 
 27 
All rights reserved 
© 2015, VERA consortium 
Project funded under the Socio-
economic Sciences and Humanities
as global problems such as global warming. In this new approach, the central actors are ‘proximity 
actors’ (cities and regions). They are the ones that address the perceived societal challenges (whether 
specific or shared, local or global). This does not mean that there are no issues to address at the 
European level, but they are defined differently: they deal with the horizontal conditions that are needed 
to make local innovations to address societal problems possible, and allow their circulation in other 
spaces. The discussions about this very different scenario have highlighted four complementary needs 
for European-level activity.  
(i) One is for a set of infrastructures that connect localities and enable circulation between spaces (the 
scenario is not one of closure and retains the existence and even importance of international flows of 
goods and services). The list of infrastructures is however different or in given domains shaped 
differently (like digital payment for the banking infrastructure or crowd funding for gathering resources). 
The internet is a major resource facilitating access to distributed knowledge and to local experiments 
and practices. The balance between physical communication infrastructures has strongly evolved in 
favour of low-energy consuming modes even if far slower and similarly local modes of energy 
production as well as decentralised energy networks prevail. 
(ii) The second specific feature lies in the need for forums and platforms of exchange where local actors 
can exchange and learn from one another. These platforms are also the ways through which local 
actors (e.g. cities) learn that they share the same problems and have similar views about addressing 
them. They in turn supports bottom-up based alliances to develop solutions jointly. It is also through 
these forums and platforms that local actors learn about solutions developed in other places. Yet, for 
this learning to take place, local actors need to be satisfied that the policies developed elsewhere will 
work in their particular context. This links with the third distinctive need for Europe. 
(iii) The third need deals thus with the assessment of policy responses to social problems. For local 
solutions to circulate and be taken up elsewhere, they need to be assessed so that other localities learn 
how these policies work, for whom and under what conditions.  
(iv) Goods traded into or across Europe have to comply with  dominant values in aspects like their 
environmental impact and the social conditions of production. The result is the development of new 
European norms and standards. Europe’s role as a “regulatory state” grows and becomes its main 
“raison d’être”. In a way REACH is a frontrunner of such an evolution, showing that a retraction in terms 
of direct R&D involvement can coincide with increased normative responsibilities at the European level. 
Supporting innovation at the firm level 
Supporting innovation and the firm, as a way to support the competitiveness of European firms in global 
markets has ceased to be a priority. First, there is an emphasis on the provision of goods and services 
at the local level and on issues like quality of life; “economic competitiveness” is no longer a concept 
that influences policy definition, and technological leadership in many fields has been contentedly left to 
other world regions. Second, the way in which societal needs are being addressed requires moderate 
levels of technological innovation. Many of the technologies that are required to support the local 
economies have been known for many years. What is considered a challenge is not the development of 
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new technologies, but the creation of the social and economic conditions conducive to the application of 
existing technologies in ways that are congruent with the dominant political objectives. Further, the 
regulatory role that Europe is playing with increasing force, is not seen as a tool to improve the 
competitiveness of European firms but as a way of supporting the development of congenial social and 
environmental conditions. There is no industrial type policy at EU or even national level, potential 
supports are only local, although some local firms may still retain global markets 
Science base 
The notion that society is knowledge-based  has remained, but the way in which this is understood has 
changed substantially from the early years of the Century. First there is no perception of a need for 
strong and continuing technological development, and knowledge is therefore no longer seen as 
condition needed to support technological innovation. The main applied needs for new knowledge 
revolve around issues like the effects of regulations and norms, the effectiveness of different policy 
strategies under different contextual conditions, and the social and economic organisation of new urban 
models. The core of applied research has moved to the social sciences. Yet, the way in which social 
science is understood and practiced has also changed: notions like “Responsible Research and 
Innovation” led to the development of models of research that sought the systematic contribution of a 
variety of stakeholders to the construction of new research. The generation of  knowledge is no longer 
the sole remit of professional individual researchers and organisations. Policies seeking the generation 
of new knowledge are also designed at the local level, and taking into account local conditions and 
needs. The structure of research organisations and higher education institutions has therefore become 
highly fragmented, but it is not hierarchical. General notions of “excellence” that sought to be 
comparable across organisations and nations and that had become popular during the first two decades 
of the Century have been replaced by a variety of local definitions of what is good and relevant. In this 
environment, researcher mobility has become increasingly difficult, but this is not perceived as a 
problem. 
Step 2 – Europeanisation mode 
At European level the idea of the ERA has lost not only its relevance but its meaning. The transversal 
Framework Programmes have disappeared, and what is left is mostly handled by a drastically reduced 
European Commission. There is thus no European role to be played at the orientation layer, not even a 
representation one in international organisations and forums where countries, regions and often cities 
participate individually.  
The only ‘political’ role is a facilitating one based on supporting platforms and forums (see above), and, 
when ‘robust compromises’ are arrived at in these platforms, a delegation for new standards and 
regulatory frames is made by European countries on an ad-hoc fashion.  In this scenario, European 
“success” is warranted by the number of platforms that arrive to horizontal views and push for 
transversal actions for the assessment of quality and for new regulatory organisations (the REACH way) 
when needed.  
The main programming activities consuming European-level resources are the targeted R&D 
programmes addressing issues related to the redefined infrastructure, and the problems posed by the 
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development, implementation and assessment of new regulations and policies (see above). Therefore, 
activities that are still conducted at European level include platforms and forums for (1) sharing data and 
analysis about bottom-up activities, and (2) developing redefined indicators and markers of societal 
wellbeing and socio-economic development that can be applied in different local contexts. The latter can 
derive not only from the requirement to develop new European standardisation and regulatory 
frameworks but also the development of new measurement frames and quality assessment 
mechanisms 
Universities remain at the core of the performance function for their key role in education and training 
(life-long learning being increasingly important). They have all gained higher degrees of autonomy from 
national government departments and agencies and national and international regulators. They are 
driven by local and regional needs and draw an increasing share of their budgets from regional and 
local governments. The balance between hard and soft science has dramatically evolved towards the 
latter. The drive towards scientific excellence has completely disappeared (vs. local relevance) and 
competitive funding has vastly reduced, and with it the role of national and European funding agencies 
(they remain but as secondary actors).  In this movement PROs (especially the large academic 
oriented) have reduced their size or disappeared. Only those in line with the redefined ‘need for Europe’ 
have maintained their capabilities, and through a process of mergers they have become international 
(European) organizations. Finally, a new type of knowledge brokers has emerged; their role is to enable 
the capitalisation of local experiments and insure their circulation to other interested regions. Some early 
examples of this model emerged in the 00s, for instance in the field of biodiversity offsetting.  
Innovation activities are as much the remit of firms as of bottom-up organised stakeholder groups, local 
communities and of networks bringing them together. There are no shared views about the role of firms 
(large and small) and this depends upon regional choices that can widely differ. Some regions may 
develop solutions to their societal issues that nurture firm competitiveness, but this is in no way a shared 
approach.  
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Scenario 4 Times of crises – Experts at the wheel 
Step 1 – Policy Priorities 
Scenario 4 is triggered by an environmental crisis. The global warming associated with the explosion of 
weather disasters and the disappearance of arctic ice have driven Europe to focus on mitigation and 
adaptation policies (prevention is no longer an option). This response and very focused way of 
addressing sustainability has given great power and responsibility to ‘experts’ that work in better 
SCENARIO 3 – KEY FEATURES 
  
Policy priorities 
1- European institutions act as a facilitator for sharing the experiences of local and 
regional actors to foster exchange and learning.  
2- Deployment of Europe-wide communication infrastructures (both physical and ICTs). 
Support communication technologies that are low consumers of energy. 
3- Development of European norms and standards dealing with the environmental 
impact of traded goods and services and their social conditions of production.  
4- Evaluation of the effects of regulations and norms, and of the effectiveness of 
different policy strategies under different contextual conditions. 
Institutional foci 
5- The key governmental actors are ‘proximity actors’ (cities and regions). 
6- European institutions narrow focus on the programming of R&D funding to support 
redefined communications infrastructure, and to assess the problems posed by the 
development, implementation and assessment of new regulations and policies. 
7- Increasingly autonomous universities focus on education and training (life-long 
learning being increasingly important). 
8- Deployment of problem-based forums and platforms for exchange and learning 
among local and regional organisations. 
Key implications of the scenario 
9- Public policy addresses societal challenges in a decentralized manner with little 
intervention at the European level. 
10- Policy focuses on changing lifestyles rather than seeking new technology-based 
solutions to existing problems. 
11- Supporting innovation at the firm as a way to support the competitiveness of 
European firms in global markets is not a priority. 
12- Proliferation of bottom-up mechanisms to fund local experimentation, e.g. crowd 
funding 
13- PROs have drastically reduced their size and some of them have disappeared 
altogether. 
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understanding environmental phenomena, anticipating dynamics and identifying their major driving 
forces. The role of these experts is not only scientific or technical, but it is explicitly linked to policy 
definition and implementation. As a consequence these experts are directly involved in political 
decisions and in processes of institutional change. In other words, an epistemic community that has 
emerged in the field of environment has become an “hegemonic” actor in the field of science, 
technology and innovation policy. 
This hegemonic role extends to all levels – from the local to the global –, and shapes the definition of all 
priorities. The need to tackle environmental change has become the most important overall driver of all 
STI policies. This has driven to 4 key main features: the development of a set of research programmes 
each addressing a given domain of adaptation/mitigation; reorienting the innovation ecology (mostly 
through standards and regulation); developing a substantial collaborative programme along the 
EUREKA model to speed-up the innovation process in relevant areas; and focusing the support to the 
science base on research areas that can contribute to breakthrough solutions for adaptation to and 
mitigation of the effects of climate change.  
The following paragraphs detail these key features along the three high level priorities.  
Societal missions 
There is only one overarching societal challenge, adaptation to the climate crisis. Yet, dealing with the 
effects of climate change means activities in very different domains, each becoming the objective 
source of a specific programme. The list of domains is long: urban management, energy provision, new 
forms of housing, mobility, food production and circulation, adaptation of maritime regions and seaside 
cities, re-design of capital and consumer goods (modular design, very long life, role of additive 
manufacturing in maintenance and upgrading, ‘intelligent’ recycling…). All aspects of our life styles are 
concerned including tourism, leisure and culture.  
These programmes are aimed at finding solutions to specific, climate-related, problems and often 
revolve around the development of technology-based components and innovations. They also have 
another important dimension dealing with adaptation in practices and lifestyles and requiring collective 
experiments (often pushed by cities or given regions) testing new approaches, which in turn shape the 
type of technical solutions and systems required. This relationship between technical solutions and 
social and organization change leads to “multi-level” programmes addressing both technical problems 
and socio-economic issues. Some of these programmes deal with global problems, and are either 
themselves, global in nature, or support exchanges with research groups outside Europe.  
Supporting innovation at the firm level 
The main focus of STI policy is, as described above, the development of solutions to the problems 
posed by climate change. Many of the domains addressed by this policy involve private firms; typically 
as the producers of products and services that need to be adapted to the new environmental situation. 
We can distinguish two main types of instruments seeking to speed-up such adaptation by providing 
support or other forms of incentive to private firms:  
 32 
All rights reserved 
© 2015, VERA consortium 
Project funded under the Socio-
economic Sciences and Humanities
 (i) Instruments that provide a friendly context for firms to develop and introduce new products, services 
and systems that can help deal with the new environmental situation. For instance, public procurement 
has been adapted to favour co-development of innovative solutions between the public sector and firms. 
The public sector emerges as the buyer and therefore the lead users of these solutions, and keeps 
control of how these solutions are implemented (therefore these are not public private partnerships like 
the ones that evolved under Scenario 1). Another important tool that provides favourable conditions for 
firms to be innovative is the introduction of new standards and regulatory frameworks.  
(ii) Direct financial support to the development and introduction of innovations. Financial support is being 
offered by regional, national and European authorities. This tools include collaborative arrangements 
following the EUREKA model that enable systematic but distributed joined-action.  
It must be noted that not all firms and sectors will be facing a supportive environment. The new rules, 
regulations and market conditions will lead to the reduction in the market size of some sectors, like, for 
instance, aerospace and air travel. The effects on tourism will be marked, with regions that had 
developed a model of tourism based on long-distance mobility being negatively affected and 
experiencing decreasing levels of welfare. Further, the degree to which the European context will help 
the global competitiveness of European firms will often depend on the extent to which other regions 
outside Europe adopt the environmental standards and regulations that have driven European 
innovation. 
The science base 
Scientists and technical experts play a crucial role in this scenario. Their new acquired political 
influence, and their capacity to define STI policies, is in part based on their capacity to anticipate the 
environmental crisis and the recognition that their warnings had for a long time been ignored. Now, 
science is widely recognised as being crucial for the understanding of the conditions that are causing 
the “grand challenge” that society faces, and as a foundation on which new solutions enabling 
adaptation will be built. There is a continuous increase of resources invested in scientific research but 
this are targeted to a narrow set of disciplines directly related with the “epistemic community” now 
controlling STI policy.  
This investment has two components. One continues to be ‘breakthrough’ driven (for both science and 
technology) with a clear view of new knowledge needed to enable adaptation. There is a shared 
recognition that this has to be addressed directly at the European level. This reinforces the role of 
European-level agencies. The other is about the complex dimensions of the solutions and the deep 
integration they require between natural and social sciences as well as engineering.  There is a need for 
cross-disciplinary collaboration and interaction with stakeholders. This has driven the emergence of new 
European level programmes supporting bottom-up unconventional initiatives promoted by societal 
actors in collaboration with researchers from a variety of disciplines.  
This “federal” approach to knowledge production concurs with increased investment at national and 
regional levels, in a mix of direct support and competitive funding. This enables national and regional 
governments to address ‘more specific issues that a federal level has difficulties to cope with. It also 
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enables a variety of alliances and joint programmes to complement the federal level (at least 30% of 
national competitive funds are channelled through such ‘joint programmes’). 
Step 2 – Europeanisation mode 
At the orientation function, one central lesson from the multiplication of JPIs in the second part of the 
2010s has been their huge transaction costs and limited flexibility. When facing the climate disasters , a 
clear political choice was made to simplify approaches, delegating to the European level the 
responsibility to shape and operate the set of domain-specific, problem-solving programmes. As 
responsibilities were transferred to the EU, the orientation and to a large extent also the programming 
functions took place within the decision-making structures of the European Commission. The complex 
“commitology” structure and procedures, developed over decades, are the framework through which the 
“epistemic communities” and “advocacy groups” involved on environmental issues, exercise their 
influence.  This approach is flexible in that the individuals and organizations involved in decision-making 
through committees and advisory groups are specific to each domain. This enables the involvement of 
public authorities and key stakeholders (including NGO and philanthropic organisations), together with 
Commission officials in the governance of each policy domain.  
The programming function is shared by the European Commission structures that dominate the 
orientation function and a set of European agencies and foundations that have been put in charge of 
policy implementation. Here “implementation” is understood in a broad sense, including the translation 
of the objectives and policies defined through the orientation function into specific programmes that the 
agencies and foundations are then in charge of operating. The agencies and foundations in charge of 
the programme implementation share a common characteristic: they have at their disposal a portfolio of 
instruments, e.g. for supporting city-level demonstrations, or pre-normative activities, or early-user 
investment4.  
This is not a world without tensions. We see two tensions that may threaten the development of this 
scenario. One potential issue may come from co-ordination problems between agencies / foundations 
on transversal issues and of potential antagonistic solutions promoted. Another may come from the key 
role played by experts in this scenario. This runs the risk of generating a new divide between citizens 
and the local problems they face and ‘one size fits all’ solutions pushed forward by ‘far-away’ structures.  
Both universities and PRO play important roles in the performance function. PRO play in most 
programmes the role of solution integrators, enabling the move from technology to demonstrations and 
collective experiments. As the most significant programmes have an European scope, and research 
groups increasingly specialise in specific domains, PROs that used to operate at the national level have 
started to engage in international mergers and change their governance structures, often moving from 
public to not for profit organisations). Universities, even the most research intensive, are experiencing 
an evolution of their thematic portfolios as they adapt to the demand for knowledge and training in areas 
                                                     
4
 To have a better view, see the Manchester compendium of evidence on research and innovation policies. A 
specific report is dedicated to policy mixes and one situation deals with policy mixes within funding 
agencies. 
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relevant to the current research priorities. The growth of investments in the broad range of areas to 
climate change and the mitigation of its effects have provided numerous opportunities for careers and 
made of higher education and research attractive employment sectors for those trained in the relevant 
fields.  
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SCENARIO 4 – KEY FEATURES 
Policy priorities 
1- There is only one overarching societal priority: the mitigation and adaptation to the 
climate crisis. 
2- Definition of R&D programmes to adapt to and mitigate the effects of climate change in a 
variety of fields including urban management, housing, energy provision, mobility, food 
production and circulation, endangered species, adaptation of maritime regions and seaside 
cities. 
3- Use of public procurement to support co-development of new products, services and 
systems that can help deal with the new environmental situation. 
4- Introduction of new standards and regulations to support environment-friendly 
development, manufacturing, use and disposal of products.  
Institutional foci 
5- Many orientation and programming functions have been transferred to the EU and its 
organisations. Responsibility to shape and operate the set of domain-specific, problem-solving 
programmes lies in EU organisations. 
6- Many programming functions take place within the decision-making structures of the 
European Commission. 
7- Central role of European-level resources. Wider remit of activities: funds for research, 
experimentation and innovation 
8- Complementary support offered by regional, national and European organisations. 
9- Multiple complementary activities driven by concerned groups and philanthropic 
organizations, covering both programming and performing functions. 
10- International coordination and collaborative arrangements by national agencies enabling 
systematic but distributed joined-action (along the lines of ERA-Nets, and the EUREKA model). 
11- Collective experimentation involving actors at different levels (local, regional,…) are an 
important feature of the performance of STP programmes. 
12- Evolving role of PROs as solution integrators (e.g. new water management solutions) and 
as key actors in shaping the necessary infrastructures for adaptation research, e.g. satellite 
monitoring. 
Other implications of the scenario 
13- Important role of environmental expert community, going beyond the provision of 
scientific and technical, to become directly involved in political decisions and in processes of 
institutional change.  
14- Emergence of new European programmes supporting bottom-up initiatives promoted by 
societal actors in collaboration with researchers from a variety of disciplines. 
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FINAL REMARKS ON THE LENSING APPROACH 
 
The policy lensing approach has helped us go further with scenarios that were initially developed 
through desk research, expert engagement and a clear FTA scenario methodology. By looking at 
these worlds from the view of (a) policy goals, (b) policy action spaces (in terms of functional layers) 
and (c) modes of Europeanisation, we have further developed and analysed the research and 
innovation worlds described in the four scenarios. 
This further development enables a next step, the extraction of “Issues for policy discussion today”, 
when backcasting from these future worlds to today’s research and innovation choices. We have 
made this step, and the full text on “issues for policy discussion” is provided in this report. 
The policy-lensing approach as we have described it, is not focused on building consistent scenario-
worlds per se, but focuses on interpreting and fleshing out these worlds to inform policy decisions 
today. This means the analyst undertaking policy lensing, retains the tools and skill sets of an FTA 
analyst whilst placing him or herself in a position of a policy shaper, applying various lenses. 
Between the authors of this paper, we have discussed whether the policy priorities and functional 
layers should have been included in the original scenarios. We concluded, and suggest this to our 
readers, that the policy lensing expands on the raw scenarios in a very structured policy-oriented 
manner, drawing on theory to help us derive policy interpretations and conclusions; yet if we had 
constructed the scenarios guided by such policy frames these may have been more constrained and 
would not have explored plausible future contexts and developments in the way they now do. We 
propose that there are two specific contributions of policy lensing as an independent activity after 
the development of policy endogenous scenarios:  
(1) Policy practice oriented refinement i.e. fleshing out the scenarios with respect to relevant 
operational policy categories (lens 2). Interpreting the scenarios for the three layers provides a real 
added value as it bridges from the general policy factors to the operational lens of the policy context. 
This is something that cannot be done in the collective process of scenario building as it is not 
accessible to the non-policy participants. In short, it can be a further step in tailoring scenario output 
into usable intelligence for policy action.  
(2) Normative Assessment i.e. assessing the scenarios vis-a-vis acknowledged policy goals of today. 
This is visible in lens 1. We feel that this approach yields very valuable insights like, for example, in 
the raw scenario where “challenge orientation” is no longer high on the policy agenda, through the 
lensing we could see that there is a potential for progress towards it. Both aspects are well in line 
with the notion of adaptive foresight which suggests a special sense making phase for each actor 
group and in particular policy. 
Finally, we argue that this positioning of the FTA analyst in the hot-seat of a policy shaper requires 
the development of “robust lenses”. Our interest in this project was on the European research and 
innovation landscape and aspects of Europeanisation (cf. European Research Area). What is key is 
that the lenses are constructed in a systematic and transparent way.  
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Abstract  
In this paper we present ‘Policy Lensing’ of future scenarios as an analytical step in its own right and as a 
genuine activity in the elaboration of strategic policy intelligence. The previous four FTA seminars have 
revealed a wealth of tools, techniques and applications of FTA for forecasting science and technology 
developments, up to and including technology transitions.  As STI policy scholars and professional 
analysts, we are interested in applying FTA to inform policy shapers about the future research and 
innovation landscape.  What we have realised is that translating the often very rich and complex outputs 
of FTA into policy relevant intelligence is not a negligible step.  In fact, we have found the literature rather 
lacking in this regard. Over a 12-month period, the EC FP7 funded project entitled Visions of the 
European Research Area (VERA) has, through a systematic exploration and interaction with experts, 
developed four scenarios of the European research and innovation system in 2030.   
The challenge we faced, once these scenarios of four different ERA-worlds were completed, was to 
evaluate what does this mean for today in terms of policy implications and issues about the European 
research and innovation system and modes (and degrees) of Europeanisation? To this end, the VERA 
consortium has created a policy-lensing approach as an additional step in probing these scenarios to 
provide details that speak to policy shapers.   We use the term lensing because the approach translates 
scenario “worlds” in terms of perspectives from a policy shaper stand point, but also alters and adds to the 
scenario texts, it requires further elaboration of the scenario world.  This hybrid role of translation and 
further scenario articulation means the approach sits between the worlds of the FTA analyst and the policy 
shaper, combining the perspectives and assessment processes from both worlds.   
In this paper we present three sets of lenses, that have been developed and tested, dealing with policy 
goals (competitive innovation environment, strong science base and addressing societal grand 
challenges), functional layers (Orientation, Programming and Performing) and Europeanisation 
(Integration, Coordination and Juxtaposition). These lenses may be useful for the application of other FTA 
outputs to the development of Research and Innovation policies, and thus have broader application than 
the VERA project. 
 
Keywords: Scenarios of the European Research Area, Research and Innovation Futures, Meta-Analysis, Strategic 
Policy Intelligence 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Foresighting research & innovation system governance with a view to policy 
Understanding and managing national and international research and innovation systems has 
been high on the agenda for many years now, and a key focus of FTA analysts (Sarewitz et al. 
1999, Kuhlmann 2001, Kuhlmann and Edler 2003; Georghiou et al. 2008; Schoen et al. 2011).  
Focusing on Europe a consortium of ten research teams have come together to explore 
potential futures  in the European research and innovation system, both in terms of foci of 
research and innovation, governance of the research and innovation system and modes of 
Europeanisation and consider their implications for European research and innovation policy.  
This consortium, funded by the 7th European Framework Programme in the project “Visions of 
the European Research Area” (VERA)1 was set up to provide relevant strategic intelligence for 
the future governance and priority-setting of the European research and innovation system. 
VERA has a dual focus: geographically, there is a focus on European level research and 
innovation activities; politically VERA is interested in the governance of these activities.  The 
central movement we consider is on-going shifts in the European research and innovation 
system of both the activities themselves, policy definition and implementation around specific 
priorities and the modes (and degrees) of Europeanisation. The assumption is that the European 
Union has been and is generating a unique situation worldwide dealing both with research and 
innovation activities and policies. The creation of a “European Research Area” has been used to 
qualify both the future world aimed at and the transformation processes towards this new world 
(Hooghe & Marks 2001; Majone 2009, Edler et al. Behrens 2003; Borrás 2004). 
With this in mind, VERA has carried out an in-depth stocktaking of research and innovation 
system forward looking activities in Europe and internationally and a thorough review of trends 
and drivers of long-term change of European research and innovation systems and governance.  
On the basis of these insights VERA has endeavoured to develop four scenarios describing 
potential evolutions of the European research and innovation system, making explicit the critical 
issues for the ERA’s future capabilities emerging from these scenarios, and then exploring 
subsequent issues for policy discussion today.   
1.2 Scenarios as future intelligence for informing policy 
Scenario building is one of the most widely established Foresight methods. Most Foresight 
scholars refer to scenarios as “consistent images of possible futures” (Ringland 2002, p. 2). It is 
argued that rigorously imagining different future pathways forces us to stretch our mental models 
and confront our collective and individual clichés, biases (Godet 2001) and anticipatory 
assumptions (Miller 2007). Furthermore, scenario building is expected to enable organisations to 
generate projects and decisions that are more robust under a variety of alternative futures (van 
                                               
1 http://eravisions.eu 
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der Heijden 2005, p. 5) but also to better unlock the potential of the present by reaping the 
potential of the complexity of our surroundings (Miller 2007).  
Part of the benefit of scenario development is expected to emerge through the collective process 
of developing the scenarios - the “strategic conversation” (van der Heijden 2005). Accordingly, in 
several scenario exercises the development process is deemed as important as the scenarios 
developed (van Asselt, et al. 2010 p. 29). Benefits that are mentioned most often include 
deliberation of expectations, forming of shared language and common ground across diverse 
actor groups, raising awareness about upcoming challenges (da Costa et al 2008) and opening 
up of perception filters (Schirrmeister and Warnke 2013). While these benefits may well emerge 
within the scenario development process2 the generation of robust strategies from the scenarios 
is less obvious. The way the link between scenarios and strategies is conceptualised widely 
differs for different types of scenarios (van Notten et al. 2003). Some scenarios already 
incorporate a certain strategy. Often in these cases one scenario describes an optimum strategy 
and a desired outcome such as e.g. the “Flight of the Flamingos” scenario in the famous “Mont 
Fleur” scenarios on the future of South Africa (van Asselt, et al. 2010 p.30). This type of scenario 
is often called “normative” and does not require a specific strategy development phase. Rather, 
the scenarios can directly be used to discuss strategic options. 
In many cases however scenarios do not directly describe the system at stake but different 
possible contexts or environments of the system. In some of these cases there is no best or 
worst case scenario, but all scenarios combine different elements into a consistent image that 
will be perceived to be positive or negative depending on the actor’s perspective. This type of 
exploratory context scenario has been widely used to underpin strategic decision making ever 
since it was introduced by Pierre Whack for Shell in the early 1970s (van der Heijden 2005, p. 
3). In these cases the scenarios create a conceptual wind tunnel where strategies can be tested 
under various conditions. In this approach the route from the scenario exercise to the strategy 
building involves several additional steps (Ringland 2002, p. 185). Most crucially a vision of the 
organisation’s or systems’ foremost goals and assessment of the current situation need to be 
developed. In a second step, assets and barriers for achieving this vision are assessed for each 
scenario.  Depending on the organisation’s attitude towards risk, different types of strategies can 
now be developed.  A robust strategy will e.g. cater for several scenarios whereas a high 
risk/high return strategy may focus on a scenario with a particularly high gain. In any case, the 
scenario exercise enables the adoption of an adaptive strategy by monitoring the evolution of 
the critical factors highlighted in the scenario exercise. Finally, depending on the power of the 
organisation it may be decided to attempt actively influencing the context towards a certain 
desirable outcome. 
1.3 The scenario approach that was applied 
To be able to support future oriented strategy building for research and innovation actors in 
Europe, the VERA project took scenarios as its central methodology. The objective was to 
develop contrasting scenarios which would aid the consortium in exploring the key issues, 
drivers and interdependencies of future research and innovation landscapes (Popper 2008, 
Robinson 2009, Van Vliet et al. 2012).  A full detailed description of the scenario development 
                                               
2 It is often stressed however that in order to achieve lasting impact the mindset of the scenario building 
needs to be incorporated into the organization (Ringland 2002, van der Heijden, Pillkahn) 
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process is given in Teufel et al. 2013, but we summarise the process here and in Box 03 provide 
summaries of the scenarios that were developed. 
 
For the VERA scenarios, a key factor approach was chosen from the variety of available 
scenario development methods, and was applied following the common four step approach:4  
a) The identification and selection of key factors, 
b) The development of alternative assumptions for each factor, referred to as "factor 
projections", 
c) The development of different scenarios as consistent combinations of these 
assumptions, and 
d) The writing of scenario essays on this basis. 
This process enabled a systematic and transparent scenario development with distinct scenarios 
of European RTDI governance and its context. Workshops were also employed as a tool to 
develop alternative factor projections making use of stakeholders’ knowledge, insights and 
expertise (van Vliet et al. 2012, p. 755). This allowed the expansion of the set of alternative 
aspects that would feed into the scenario and further elaborate the interdependencies and 
tensions between them.  
The scenarios that were developed using the “Three Horizons” futures technique (Curry and 
Hodgson 2008) with some elements of multi-level entanglements (Genus and Coles 2008; 
Robinson 2009; Smith et al. 2010). Such perspectives assume that alternative future 
developments and configurations of the research landscape and its global, socio-economic 
context exert external pressure to change on the system of RTDI governance over time.  
Following this thrust, the selection of key factors is not only attributed to the form and mode of 
European research and innovation governance, but also to the (global and European) research 
landscape and practices and related aspects of the global, socio-economic context (Teufel et al 
(2013) p3). The resulting four scenarios (summarised in Box 0) represented four different 
evolutions of the present day research and innovation system. 
 
Box 0 : Scenario summaries 
Scenario 1: Private Knowledge – Global Markets 
In this scenario, today’s European Research Area gradually evolves into what one might call a Global Innovation 
Area, where research is mainly legitimized by its contribution to innovativeness, competitiveness and growth. As a 
result of limited public funds, growing inequalities between Member States and the jostling for political influence 
within Europe, private actors, mainly firms, dominate the financing of the research landscape and thus the setting 
of research priorities. The coordination and integration of worldwide research, technological development and 
innovation are primarily managed by global, vertical networks and value chains. 
Scenario 2: Societal Challenges – Joint Action 
In this view of the future, today’s European Research Area has developed its research and innovation capacities 
incrementally as efficient responses to the Grand Societal Challenges. This means that economic growth and job 
creation have become an even stronger priority, and that issues like climate change or health protection are 
                                               
3 We have labelled it Box 0 to emphasise these scenarios are the FTA intelligence that is the object of the 
policy lensing approach described in this paper. 
4 See Dönitz et al. 2013 (p. 13) for a description of a similar four step approach. 
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perceived as Grand Challenges. For the governance of research, technological development and innovation, this 
means that national governments play a strong role, but regions also evolve into powerful political actors. 
Compared to the European research and innovation system of 2014, orienting joint action along specific thematic 
lines in different European sub-regions means differences in economic and innovative capacities across European 
regions and states, leading to less Europe wide integration, but to European sub-region integration. 
Scenario 3:  Solutions apart – Local is beautiful 
This scenario captures the vision that today’s understanding of progress is transformed into a human-centred 
rationale, where e.g. happiness and quality of life are operationalized into new measures of progress. Research 
and innovation in Europe are transparent and open to individual or societal needs, in particular regarding new ways 
of living together, health or data privacy. The main new element in the governance of research, technological 
development and innovation is the increased participation of citizens. The open landscape for research, 
technological development and innovation provides a good basis for close ties with society around micro/regional 
level activities where society can become involved and/or invest in research and innovation activities. 
Scenario 4: Times of Crises – Experts at the Wheel 
This scenario takes up the idea that today’s economic rationales (jobs and growth) have been transformed into an 
approach where a sustainable development path is viewed as the main rationale of progress. European-level 
coordination and policies play a strong role in steering research, technological development and innovation 
towards the overall goal and, at the same time, in worldwide networking and managing international collaboration. 
Experts play key policy roles becoming heavily involved in policy definition and implementation. Research is 
funded by a wide range of actors, who define programmes primarily to deliver useful outcomes for sustainable 
development. Private and public sector research around the globe is increasingly complemented by “citizen 
science”; as a consequence, the role of the “expert” extends and expands significantly. 
 
The four VERA scenarios in Box 0 differ from the wind tunnelling type of scenarios in two key 
respects. Firstly, they are not pure “context scenarios”. Rather the behaviour of several key 
actors’ such as European and national level RTI policy makers, universities, NGOs, citizens and 
industry is actually incorporated into the scenarios along with some more factors more external 
to the RTI system such as the global economic situation. This approach is in line with the insight 
that in the case of policy oriented scenarios the wind tunnelling is less useful as “policy free” 
scenarios will hardly provide relevant storylines (van Asselt, et al. 2010 p.41), Secondly, in 
contrast to many of the textbook cases that were developed for one particular client, the VERA 
scenarios are meant to support future oriented strategy building for a wide range of actor groups 
concerned with research and innovation in Europe and beyond. Each of these actors needs to 
engage in their own sense making process in order to draw conclusions for their strategy 
building. Following the notion of adaptive Foresight (Eriksson, Weber 2008), the VERA project 
has set up such a strategic process within eight focus groups each targeting specific stakeholder 
groups.5 
1.4 A need for a further step of translating the scenarios from a policy 
perspective  
Even though the four VERA scenarios have proved to be valuable catalysts for strategic 
conversations in various stakeholder groups such as universities, research funders, industry and 
civil society they hold particular relevance for policy makers active in research, innovation and 
technology policy. However, the often very rich and complex exploratory scenarios that are 
incorporating policy as an endogenous element are difficult to translate into policy relevant 
                                               
5 C.f. VERA Workpackage 5 see http://eravisions.eu 
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intelligence.  In fact, we have found the literature rather lacking in this regard. Thus there is a 
need for amplifying these scenarios with respect to a policy perspective. 
With this in mind, in this paper we present “policy lensing” as a tailored approach to sense 
making and linking exploratory scenarios to future oriented strategies for policy shapers. Policy-
lensing is an additional step to help transform FTA intelligence, like the four VERA scenarios, 
into a form that speaks to policy shapers.  We use the term lensing because the approach 
translates scenario “worlds” in terms of perspectives from a policy shaper stand point, but also 
alters and adds to the scenario texts: it requires further elaboration of the scenario world.  This 
hybrid role of translation and further scenario articulation means the approach sits between the 
world of the FTA analyst and policy shaper, combining the perspectives and assessment 
processes from both worlds.   
This paper walks the reader through the process.  It first describes the policy lenses chosen and 
why.  It then presents one example VERA scenario, and shows the lensing and filtering through.  
We then reflect on the process and its broader application.  To keep this paper to a reasonable 
size, we have limited ourselves to showing the process for one of the four VERA scenarios only.  
However, you can find a full draft version of the four policy lensed scenarios at www.policy-
lensing.com.  
2 Three policy lenses  
To be able to explore the future scenarios of the European research and innovation landscape, 
as analysts we put ourselves in the position of a policy shaper.  First, policy shapers6 dealing with 
research and innovation today have policy priorities.  Next policy is developed and implemented 
in different functional spaces that need to be considered separately (it is not the same to define a 
policy and its rationale, implementing it, and having societal actors responding to it). Thirdly there 
are questions of Europeanisation, which forms are possible, desirable and (un)necessary. 
This section will outline the three policy lenses that we have developed to help us probe the four 
research and innovation scenarios developed within the VERA consortium. 
2.1 Lens 1: Three policy priorities in research and innovation 
There is a long-standing categorisation of the types of policies, associated with theoretical 
developments about the role of states and Governments (e.g. Chaminade & Edquest 2010). It 
recognises three major priorities: research and innovation for Government missions; shaping the 
innovation space (with protection of inventors, protection of users and coping with market 
failures); and support to the specific (quasi) public good that is science.  OECD development 
goals speak about the changing balance in time and space between these 3 priorities (Brooks et 
al. 1971).  
The early ages of Government involvement in science and technology have been associated in 
most developed countries to Defence, where Defence has remained the largest public spender 
in quite a number of countries, well after the end of the cold war. The enlargement of the sphere 
of Government missions is a major phenomenon that spans the last century – for example with 
communications, energy, health and environment – even if modes of interventions have 
changed over time. In many countries, mission-based public funding represents the vast majority 
of central expenditures, the US being the paramount example of this focus. Mission-orientation 
was central at the time of the first EU-level interventions building the core of the pre-framework 
                                               
6 We use the term “policy shapers”, rather than “policy makers”, to broaden the notion of the users and 
appliers of policy intelligence to shape research and innovation policies. 
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times, and has now been transformed into more open-ended objectives defined as “grand” or 
“societal” challenges. 
Invention and new products have been at the core of the ‘capitalist revolution’. Protecting 
inventors so that they can bear the fruit of their inventions is written in the US constitution; 
national systems as we see them now have emerged in the 1840s, and the first international 
trade treaty was dedicated to industrial patenting. Framing market conditions is a central remit of 
policies, and has been de facto a central element of the Europeanisation of markets (with 
standards in particular). However one cannot understand the very old and, for a long time fast 
growing, intervention of Government in innovation without considering the notion of market 
failures (more recently enlarged to system failures - requiring direct Government support). Also 
of importance is the fact that intellectual property is at the core of renewed trade discussion 
should thus surprise nobody: patents are an intrinsic part of the growth dynamics, as has 
become their counterpart, user/customer/worker safety that is the other facet of Government 
shaping of markets. 
The post WWII environment following the US Bush report (1945) made of science and 
fundamental research the key source of major innovations. The need for research policy in 
support of basic and fundamental research is thus predicated on such utilitarian considerations.. 
Currently fashionable policy concepts like ‘research excellence’ and ‘frontier science’ reflect this 
focus on the importance of basic research. 
Our central assumption is that the balance between these 3 types of intervention is critical to the 
characterisation of the “research and innovation landscape”, and is an integral part to consider in 
our 2030 scenarios. What explains the relative position of one or the other, and understanding 
their modes of deployment in the governance of the European research and innovation 
landscape is an intrinsic dimension of the internal coherence of scenarios.   
 
Box 1 Lens 1: Types of research and innovation policy  
(1) Research and innovation framework policies: shape the adequate institutional infrastructures (IPR, 
standards, and other regulatory interventions including tax regimes and public procurement practices). 
(2) Mission-oriented and challenge oriented policies: define substantial problems that need to be 
addressed through science, technology and innovation. Often combine different tools and funding 
programmes to mobilise a broad base of research and innovation actors. 
(3) Support for basic and fundamental research: We can differentiate two main avenues to provide such 
support: through the public funding of research in universities and their associated organisations, or 
through dedicate public research organisations (such as academies of science). We will also encounter 
different balances between ‘core’ and ‘competitive’ allocation of funds across countries. 
 
2.2 Lens 2: Three functional layers of research and innovation policy 
  . A long OECD tradition (linked to the post WWII construction of ‘science and technical 
policies’, later extended to ‘research and technology policies, and now to ‘innovation policies’) 
separates two universes: resource allocation on the one hand (associated with policy definition) 
and performance on the other.  Barré and colleagues (2013) have recently proposed a further 
enlargement considering a functional approach to policy, differentiating orientation, 
programming, and performance as “macro-functions” in research and innovation policy. We 
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propose to adopt this model to describe the research and innovation landscape in Europe as 
three nested functional layers (see Box 2). 
Box 2: Lens 2: Functional layers  
 
(1) Orientation functional layer: Involves the definition of policy objectives and the ways in which the 
policies envisaged will work towards the achievement of such objectives 
 
(2) Programming functional layer: Involves the translation of the objectives stated by the orientation layer 
into interventions implementing specific thematic priorities, and the allocation of resources to such 
interventions and eventually to Research and Innovation performers  
 
(3) Performance functional layer: Responsibility of research performers (PROs, Universities, firms, 
others): production of knowledge and innovation through the activities of researchers, operation of research 
infrastructures, management of projects, networks 
 
2.3 Lens 3: Modes of Europeanisation  
The third element of our policy lensing focuses on a key aspect of research and innovation 
system for the European Research Area: the types and modes of Europeanisation. The 
dominant paradigm in international affairs is that countries/states are the basic unit of analysis 
and that the dominant mode through which countries relate to one another is ‘inter-governmental 
cooperation’. In some cases specific bodies are created in charge of a dedicated activity and 
countries delegate budgets and implementation to these bodies. Science and technology have 
been an important source of such creations, with two complementary models of 
intergovernmental cooperation: one driving to the creation of a performing entity (like CERN or 
numerous other large scientific instruments), the other driving to the creation of a funding 
agency (like ESA).  
The creation of the EEC and then the EU has generated another development, by creating a 
‘federal layer’ (e.g. Trechsel 2013), which in turn develops a “research and innovation policy” 
that is operated on the basis of the global budget delegated to Europe: framework programmes 
(and their specific sub-programmes) have been the outcome of this process. Recent years have 
witnessed additional developments:  
a) multiple new frameworks have been developed to support and foster inter-country 
cooperations (ERA-Nets, JTI, Article 185…). Most of these new developments no longer 
take place at the ‘orientation’ layer but at the ‘programming layer’ (between agencies, 
and sometimes in combination with large performing organisations). 
b)  new European instruments have been created to share some orientation and 
programming functions (programming strategies, selection procedures, monitoring of 
results and effects) while funding remains within the hands of the respective national 
funders: EUREKA has been a front-runner in this movement.  
These changes have been studied in depth in a European project (JOREP) and its results 
published recently (Lepori et al. 2014). This has driven Barré and colleagues to highlight two 
complementary approaches to Europeanisation – integration and coordination - besides the 
historical situation of ‘juxtaposition’ (see Box 3).  
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Box 3: Lens 3 - Modes of Europeanisation 
 
- Integration: full delegation of decision making to a single European level entity with considerable 
autonomy and independence; strong and formalised institutionalisation, single budget 
- Coordination: joint decision making by concerned (national or regional levels) entities, based on 
common understanding, guidelines and framework of reference; decisions apply to each entity which 
implement them on a voluntary engagement basis 
- Juxtaposition: co-existence of entities acting in non-concerted way, in the ignorance of each other and / 
or in competition with each other  
 
3 An example of lensing with one scenario 
This section provides the full texts of a single scenario and its further policy lensing (see figure 
1).  We first present the full example scenario which has been developed as described in section 
1.3. We will then present the application of lens 1 in terms of policy priorities and then present 
the further lensing of scenario through lens 2 & 3 which were applied at the same time. 
 
Figure 1. The policy lensing process from original scenarios to identified key features and areas of interest. Along with 
the lenses, those boxes shaded in grey shall be presented in this article 
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3.1 Step 0 - A raw “unlensed” scenario   
Below we show a full example of one of the four scenarios outlined in box 0, for the purposes of 
the policy lensing process. 
Private Knowledge – Global Markets 
As a consequence of a series of financial crises, the variety of approaches to economic recovery 
have led to locked-in growing inequalities between countries and regions within the EU, less due 
to continued EU enlargement, than to crises in some of the “old” economies of the EU-15. Due 
to economic heterogeneity, political jostling has increased, impeding joint action. The financial 
situation across Member States remains heterogeneous and unpredictable, leading to most 
European companies focusing on short-term economic survival in a turbulent financial 
landscape. Technology-intensive sectors find it difficult to maintain medium- to long-term 
business strategies, leading to more risk-averse spending in RTDI. 
Public austerity policies leave national governments relatively little room to manoeuvre in the 
funding of RTDI. And as overall public spending on RTDI has dropped, there is a shift of 
financing to private domains. This means de facto that private actors such as big corporations 
and lobby organizations have gained significant agenda-setting power to align public RTDI 
activity with market interests.  
The coordination and integration of worldwide RTDI is primarily managed by global, vertical net-
works and value chains. European industry, where the lion’s share of European RTDI funding is 
located, engages in global RTDI networks to safeguard its competitiveness.  
In the EU, the remaining small share of public research is horizontally coordinated by closed 
circles of EU Member States, such as DACH or ORA (Open Research Area), regions and 
specialized research clusters, and limited to single win-win domains for competitiveness, such 
as the exchange of highly qualified researchers. Limited public budgets create an incentive for 
intergovernmental coordination and joint action to strive for critical mass. Still, due to the 
increased heterogeneity in a European Union of now 31 Member States, political jostling has 
also increased, so that the number of states actually collaborating in such initiatives is rather 
small. Some regulatory frameworks of the former ERA concept still persist, such as the free 
movement of researchers and open access infrastructures (although enhanced mobility also 
leads to tensions and conflicts, see below). The European Union bodies, in a trustee-like 
relationship, monitor compliance with these EU-level regulations, but have little to no power in 
coordinating research funds or influencing research priorities.  While research in some 
developed countries has significance for society at large, it is not a major issue in European 
societal and political discourses. The value of research is mainly seen in economic terms. 
Besides established firms, successful start-up entrepreneurs and representatives of competitive 
research organizations have gained selective access to policy arenas in the form of rather 
closed consultation processes.  
Research worldwide is justified by the promise of successful commercial exploitation. As the 
capacity of national governments to fund Research and Innovation programmes is very limited, 
societal needs that are not covered through commercial dynamics are increasingly addressed by 
philanthropic organizations, which actively support and coordinate research that is in line with 
their objectives. Irrespective of the funding sources, research is widely considered to be an 
entrepreneurial activity. In Europe, purely publicly funded research is rare and limited to 
genuinely public domains (i. e. security research). The scarcity of public capital means that the 
legitimization of any basic research conducted comes under strong pressure, with multiple 
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selection criteria based on the promised potential exploitation of the expected knowledge 
production. 
A substantial share of global research activity is carried out as a specialized, globally distributed 
activity embedded in differentiated value chains. Universities worldwide focus mainly on applied 
research, with basic research strongly tied to its expected relevance for future exploitation. This 
approach relies heavily on the involvement of private investors and vertical, international 
networks and cross-disciplinary research groups. The relative share of private investment in 
RTDI has increased globally. The largest share of private sector research worldwide takes place 
in China and other expanding economies, driven by the shift of lead markets such as health care 
systems and new models of mobility to these countries. A Global Innovation Area emerges due 
to the world-wide distribution of RTDI activity, where links to specialized global knowledge and 
lead markets are vital for a firm’s or region’s competitiveness.  
The research landscape in Europe is mainly influenced by knowledge-intensive sectors that are 
concentrated in the stronger, globally interconnected regional economies. The bulk of RTDI 
activity is carried out by firms; however, financial constraints and cost reduction strategies have 
split the organizational research landscape into private research providers, joint ventures 
between big firms, and public-private consortia. Moreover, the turbulent financial landscape 
hampers long-term business strategies and expensive, high-risk research activities. This causes 
some firms to include fewer research-intensive innovations in their product and service portfolio, 
others to deepen their involvement in global value chains in order to access research activities 
outside Europe.  
Due to the shift in research activity from the public to the private sector, the main product of 
European scientists is closed-door research, with private exploitation regimes predominating. 
Accordingly, IPR regimes play a strong role wherever they can be enforced.  
Competition for RTDI jobs is high. With national governments keen to retain RTDI jobs, the 
pressure on firms to “hire locally” means that any foreign candidate is required to fulfil multiple 
additional criteria. In addition, the competition for highly qualified researchers and a brain-drain 
from some Member States to others creates tension with the free migration of the RTDI 
workforce across the European Union, which comprises 31 Member States in 2030. These 
issues are on the intergovernmental agenda, but are not resolved and remain an ongoing 
concern for the Member States.  
In most parts of the world, GDP growth and job creation remain the dominant indicators of 
wealth creation. As cities, states and global regions compete in a globalized economy, additional 
indicators of progress and wealth such as “sustainability”, “equality” or “quality of life” now exist 
in niches dotted around the more economically developed areas of the world.  The moderate 
growth of the world economy is mainly driven by the continuing expansion of economies like 
India, Brazil or Mexico. Their economic success is based on the production of knowledge- 
intensive goods and services.  Both democratically elected and autocratic governments strive to 
demonstrate their ability to stimulate economic growth and job creation, considering economic 
growth an effective way to prevent societal discontent and unrest. In developed countries such 
as China, Europe, North America and Japan, the slowing and declining GDP amplifies 
international competition, reinforced in most parts of the world by a shift in economic power from 
public to private actors. 
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3.2 Step 1 – Scenario 1 through the policy priority lens 
In scenario 1, economic growth (seen mostly as revolving around private sector investment) is 
the main force driving policy design and implementation. The world is increasingly globalised 
and thus competitiveness is the central motive driving policies both at European, national and 
regional levels in Europe. The focus on economic competitiveness and growth has become even 
more pressing given that Europe has been slow to get out of the crisis and that the need for 
budgetary restraint is still a major constraint for most national and regional public authorities. 
Consequently, the private firm becomes the main locus for research and innovation. Research 
and Innovation policy focuses on supporting the innovation capabilities of private firms. At the 
European level this means ‘framing’ an environment that supports innovation in the firms. The 
development of the science base become subordinate to this main objective: a strong science 
base is seen as a way, even a requirement, to enhance the breakthrough capabilities of large 
firms (that are all global and represent the core of world industrial R&D7) and to nurture a rich 
and lively ecology of ‘new technology based firms’8. Similarly the dominant way to address 
societal issues is through public private partnerships that can harness the capacity of the private 
sector to address social challenges through the creation of new products and services, and the 
generation of new business models. 
3.2.1 Policy priority 1: Framework conditions for supporting innovation at the firm 
level 
The focus in this scenario is on the creation of a friendly environment for innovation at the firm. A 
crucial element of this environment is the existence of common European rules: IP, standards, 
innovation-based procurement, shared approaches to support for “new technology based firms”. 
All these “intangible” dimensions are complemented by a tangible one: the communication 
infrastructures that link and articulate the European market. All other classical ‘market failures’ 
interventions – for a strategic sector or for supporting SME – remain ‘national’ or ‘regional’. The 
following paragraphs develop these points. 
Europe has been able to develop a common innovation ecology based on common shared rules 
and practices. A  key feature of it is a completely integrated approach to IP and patenting: a 
single application will cover the whole of European countries thanks to an integrated process 
associating all existing offices (multiple options are possible), but also through a specific 
enforcement structure (in particular with the development of a European Patent court). Common 
European practices have also developed for (i) standardisation with European standards 
bodies becoming dominant vis-à-vis a minor role for national offices and a unified participation 
into international standardisation offices); and (ii) public procurement with public sector 
markets open to European-wide competition thanks to more encompassing directives effectively 
translated into national legislation and practice, and a shared definition of entities considered as 
‘public’. 
A second dimension of the friendly environment for private sector innovation is the existence of 
an efficient and comprehensive European communication infrastructure.  This extends to both 
physical transport and telecommunications. There has been long-standing work to explain the 
role these infrastructures play in the competitiveness of firms. Private firms have been key in 
setting and operate up this infrastructure supported by public sector investment and regulation, 
                                               
7 The 200 largest R&D spending firms represent half of world industrial R&D and the first 2000 over 80% 
(source: IPTS scoreboard). 
8 We use this term rather than start-up firms (many are not technological) and spin-off firms (many do not 
come out of universities) 
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including substantial R&D expenditures, which have been used to support a strong technological 
base in communications and a sound regulatory environment. The resulting infrastructure 
articulates a space that represents 40% of the world market, with the existence of strong firms 
both in equipment and operation.  
Other public interventions will target ‘market failures’ and the local support of small / mid-sized 
firms. The latter will remain national or regional adapted to local problems and being therefore 
very varied in their volume, modalities and direction  
3.2.2 Policy priority 2: Societal missions 
The possibilities of implementing the lasting discourse on the need to orient research and 
innovation to the solution of societal problems remain heavily constrained by the limited financial 
means at the disposal of Governments.  Organised actors, other than government organisations 
have come to play a central role in the launch of research initiatives to address societal 
problems. There are three main types of organisations behind the funding and implementation of 
such initiatives:  
1. ‘collective experiments’ bringing together interest groups, local associations, and at 
times, local government developing new approaches to fund and organise R&D 
initiatives, placing very limited demands on the public funding system; 
2.  philanthropic organisations, some of them very large and of international scope 
(following the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation “model”);  
3. ‘public-private partnerships’, where public authorities co-invest with large firms with 
the view that the solutions developed will generate new market opportunities.  
 
In one word, reflecting the budgetary situation, Government plays a very limited role in the 
choice of problems to be addressed and the definition of priorities. Following this logic, at 
European level, research funds available through the European institutions have remained 
constrained. The European institutions continue to develop and implement research and 
innovation policies to address societal problems, but the instruments used seek to stimulate and 
coordinate the contributions of other actors. This will entail more ‘à la carte’ participation and a 
de facto layered Europe.   
When looking at the different challenges being discussed today (2014) we see two of them as 
having been taken up at European level in a significant way:  
1. Energy transition continues to be a research priority, supported through PPP. Special 
attention is being paid to energy production (including decentralised production 
technologies) and transport. Other fields of research like low energy consuming 
equipment and devices are being driven by different actors and through mechanisms 
similar to today’s Forestry stewardship council. This will also apply to a range of products 
associated with climate change and the search for lower carbon footprints; mostly 
supported by concerned citizen groups.  
2. Health issues, remain important mostly those associated with ageing and lifestyle 
(obesity, diabetes, etc.). This is a field with scope for PPP articulated through instruments 
like new JPIs mostly focused on the development of new treatments (drugs, vaccines…). 
These are societal problems that offer also potential for firms to generate profits: co-
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investment between the public sector and large firms has become very common 
practice9.  
 
Firms are active in these two areas, as they constitute important and growing markets. Other 
societal missions, offering lesser scope for the generation of commercial profits have remained 
the remit of collective experiments or philanthropic organisations, and are not the subject of 
large coordination between governments.  
3.2.3 Policy priority 3: Support for a strong science base 
The core motivation for investing in the science base is to support competitiveness and 
economic growth. Excellent science is important for these goals, but is concentrated in a few 
large leading research organisations (mainly universities) offering an able counterpart to large 
firms. This strong scientific research nodes are very important for both supporting the long-term 
knowledge needs of large firms and for nurturing a lively ecology of new technology based firms. 
They thrive at the frontier of science and technology and have access to funds to support such 
research. They receive substantial private funding, but also some public support. As overall 
public resources to support scientific research remain stagnated, the backing of such centres of 
excellence means a concentration of research funding and a reinforcement of funding at the 
European level for responsive frontier science and technology.  
Two important outcomes of this scenario are (i) a stronger concentration around key science 
‘clusters’ in Europe, and (ii) a greater dualisation of Universities, with a vast majority of 
universities focusing on professional/vocational education (with probably a greater role of life-
long learning) and a small group of research-led elite universities. The former are oriented to 
serve local actors and the local industry, whereas the latter act as global actors in global 
knowledge markets.  
 
3.3 Step 2 – Europeanisation mode and functional layers  
What governance is implied by this priority on competitiveness? We consider the three policy 
functional layers in turn and within them we focus on what happens at the European level and 
how.  
In a nutshell, this scenario does not involve any major change in the ways priorities are set and 
political compromises built at the European level. There is however a breaking up of the 
overarching approach to implementation (the Framework programme-type of intervention no 
longer exists) and a ‘sectorialisation’ of research & innovation interventions. The different DGs 
are in charge of developing and implementing their R&I policies. “Horizontal” activities like the 
support for basic research and the implementation of IP policy are carried out by powerful 
autonomous agencies. The limited funding capacity of the public sector is counter-balanced by 
the rising role of NGO and philanthropic organisations that, even though often very specialised 
(e.g. on an orphan disease), collectively cover a wide range of domains.  
The following paragraphs elaborate this state of affairs for each policy functional layer. 
                                               
9 This may happen under a new form of PPP where large firms co-invest in initial stages of developments 
and the creation of start-up firms, against a priority to buy them at a later stage. Such developments are 
clearly linked to a reinforcing of the oligopolisation of the pharmaceutical industry, and the ability to retain 
large European players 
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The orientation function at the European level does not attempt to cover the whole spectrum of 
research and innovation activities; instead it focuses on institutional aspects linked to 
competitiveness and the development of a friendly innovation-ecology (IP, standards, rules for 
procurement). This represents a clear change from today’s core debates on policy orientation 
with its focus on the resources and priorities given to the common R&D support programme (for 
many year called Framework programme). The programming function has also changed 
significantly, with this common, all-encompassing programme disappearing, and R&I 
interventions being developed and implemented by the different DGs in a “sectorialised” context. 
Only some horizontal activities, like the support of basic research are conducted by agencies.  
These agencies have been reinforced and have gained autonomy. Two important agencies have 
witnessed substantial transformation: 
 An agency in charge of the development and implementation of all IP policies; integrating 
a single European patenting office, trademark office, and all activities related to the 
protection of other Intellectual Property Rights. An EU-level enforcement system is in fact 
being implemented through this single agency.  
 A single agency, following on the steps of the European Research Council, will be 
responsible for the support of basic research at European level.  
 
Within this context, some of the core policies in the current EU innovation policy landscape have 
undergone important changes. First, the support of SME’s innovation capabilities remains high 
in the agenda but given the budgetary constraints, interventions are channelled either through 
sectorial policies or through dwindling structural funds. The outcome is a diversity of instruments, 
many of limited size and targeted to specific sectors or activities. Such fragmentation 
compounds the difficulties that SMEs face to follow these instruments and access the limited 
funding available.   
Second, the role of “societal challenges”10 as a major dimension of current European discourse 
has all but disappeared.. In the current scenario, Governments have limited means to address 
them and the sectorialisation of European policy (in part triggered by squabbles over dwindling 
funds) means that coordinated inter-departmental approaches can no longer be implemented. 
The importance of such broad societal challenges continues and is still recognised, but policy 
discourse has transferred the responsibility to tackle them to “bottom-up” initiatives coordinating 
different societal stakeholders. When the market is not enough to coordinate such activities, it is 
the “new society” that organises itself to address societal problems without relying on 
bureaucratic State organizations. It is the co-investment of societal actors – both in defining the 
directions and shaping the ways to address them - that is expected to be sufficient to address 
the societal challenges. In so doing, three groups of actors play a central role: large firms with 
capabilities to invest on long-term R&D entering public-private partnerships to address societal 
problems and creating new markets on the way; ‘concerned groups’ mostly organised by NGO 
with clear foci (e.g. a given disease) and looking for solutions to it; and targeted groups of public 
                                               
10 It should be noted that “Societal challenges” must be distinguished from the pursuit of government 
missions, as understood by the OECD terminology. The terminology of societal challenge warrants the 
recognition of an important problem that cannot be handled with the usual departmental processes and 
means. Specific ways of defining the problem, the new knowledge required to address it and the ways to 
conduct the efforts have to be identified and put in action and involve a variety of actors (different 
ministries and agencies, different scientific disciplines, many social groups and stakeholders). Thus, a 
policy to address a “societal challenge” goes beyond ‘business as usual’ 
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authorities, including national governments that consider an issue so important (in political 
terms) that they need to address it.  
Although the rhetoric is compelling, orchestrating and coordinating such a diversity of groups 
within a context that is driven by private actors following growth strategies, means that very few 
‘challenges’ have been addressed by such co-investment initiatives. Instruments such as JPI 
have survived over the decades but are used sparingly. When they do, the operationalization of 
such bottom-up, broadly based, international initiatives have mostly relied on joint programmes 
articulating funding agencies in an ERA Net-like fashion11 with NGOs, and large private firms. 
Inter-governmental co-operation has thus become an important element when addressing 
societal challenges and the EC role, when it exists, is limited to that of ‘another member’ rather 
than an overseeing and orchestrating member. Instead, the role of NGOs as become important 
in pushing issues to be considered “societal challenges” and bringing together different actors in 
a flexible and constantly changing architecture.  
NGOs role has also become more important in fields like sustainable fishing or forestry through 
their contribution to stewardship councils. In this scenario, they have also replaced the role of 
Governments in standard-setting, and are playing a central role in the implementation of strong 
certification policies12, at times embedded in enlarged ISO processes (as is being the case today 
for the 26000 series on social responsibility).  
Concerning the performance function, the role of the public sector has also seen a marked 
reduction when compared to today’s (2014). Universities are the key feature of the public 
sector in this scenario. These have undergone increasing differentiation, with ‘excellent science 
and technology’ being concentrated in a small number of universities. Around these leading 
universities, a rich ecology of new technology/science based firms and of research centres of 
large firms has developed. In contrast to these few, leading universities and their surrounding 
“ecosystem”, the majority of universities address the regional needs for skilled and 
knowledgeable workforce. The vast majority of universities are therefore teaching-led and focus 
on professional/vocational education. They do undertake research activities, but these will 
mostly be problem-driven and oriented towards helping local economic actors. This type of 
research will seldom be frontier research, but rather will seek to adapt and further develop 
knowledge to provide solutions to well-defined technical problems.  
 
4 Deriving policy issues from the lensed scenarios 
In the previous section we have presented the raw scenario, followed by the elaboration and 
further lensing of the raw scenario in terms of policy interests.  The lensing of this example 
scenario, and its three sisters (see Box 0) allowed us, the authors of this paper, to derive a set of 
policy and institutional features.13 Based on these features we could identify current policy 
issues. Our selection focuses on policy issues at the European level related with key features 
that are present in more than one scenario; in other words issues that emerge as key in very 
different social and political contexts. Our analysis (given based on analysis and lensing of all 
four scenarios) distinguishes three main types of policy issues: (1) institutional, (2) framework 
conditions, and (3) direct interventions.  
                                               
11 See Lepori et al., 2014 for further developments 
12 Contrary to the new developments of soft law and codes of conduct (see Delemarle and Laredo, 2014, 
on nanotechnology) 
13 In the actual process we (the analysts in the VERA consortium, and authors of this paper) derived 55 
policy and institutional features. 
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In the remainder of this section, we define and address these in turn and we conclude with a 
consideration of several assumptions that underlie most current policy practice and which are 
questioned under several of our scenarios and thus emerge as topics for policy discussion. 
4.1 Institutional 
Institutions, understood here as formal organizations operating according to sets of rules and 
routine practices, are central to all the scenarios. What is relevant, however, is that the same 
institutions appear in several scenarios, albeit playing different roles. Different political contexts 
place different responsibilities on the same institutions.  
4.1.1 The European Union and its institutions 
Scenario 1 presents a situation in which public sector institutions are generally weak and 
fragmented. In a context of budgetary restraint, national authorities have struggled to retain a 
degree of influence over the political process and of control over economic resources. The EU 
and its institutions have not been able to grow and expand their size and remit, and their role 
has remained limited to setting regulatory structures and other framework conditions in areas 
where national authorities have decided that a degree of international coordination is absolutely 
necessary to support the activities of the private sector. The EU becomes a further agent, 
negotiating regulations and other interventions with nation-states and even regional authorities 
in a context of “variable geometry”: the alliances and arrangements across Member States and 
the European Union will vary from topic to topic. 
Scenarios 2 and 4 present a very different situation. In them, the EU and its institutions have 
become a key player, growing in size and legitimacy, and taking over responsibilities that 
currently are the remit of national and regional authorities. Yet, as the scenarios illustrate, the 
political configuration of the EU institutions will depend on the political context. In scenario 2, 
European societies come together to deal with policy problems whose solution exceeds the 
capacity of any single State. This transfer of authority to supranational organisations comes 
accompanied by the development of instruments of democratic oversight at European level: a 
strong European Parliament provides the source of democratic legitimacy, in an environment 
where policy concerns are diverse and there are differences across countries and regions as to 
the main policy challenges that need to be addressed. The situation illustrated in scenario 4 is 
very different: again the EU and its institutions have come to play a key role but there is a focus 
on a single set of problems leading to a less diversified political environment, where a 
“community” of experts in environmental and climate issues play a key role in the governance, 
not only of the science and innovation system, but of the whole policy agenda.  
Finally, scenario 3 is dominated by local and regional interests, and the role of the EU 
institutions is limited to that of a facilitator, supporting policy learning across communities. 
From a current perspective, the scenarios highlight the wide diversity of possible futures as 
concerning the role of the EU institutions and their governance. Today, the EU institutions may 
be perceived as part of the political structure: large institutions, with established bureaucracies 
and long history behind that has brought them where they are. The scenarios inform us both 
about the plausibility of substantial changes in these institutions, and of very diverse 
development paths. The evolution of the European Research Area, and of the role of the EU in 
an evolving European science and technology system can take differing paths, and such paths 
are associated with the development of different European governance structures.  
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4.1.2 Agencies 
Agencies are independent public sector organisations that contract for a service with a 
government organisation. They are ad-hoc structures to implement specific policies and are 
designed specifically for the purpose for which they have been created. Agencies can be set up 
by government departments at all levels, including supranational organisations. They can 
therefore be part of the European Union institutions analysed above, but they have a distinctive 
role to play that was stressed by several of the scenarios.  
European agencies are already present in today’s ERA strategies; the management of research 
programmes is being transferred to specialised agencies like the European Research Council 
Executive Agency and the Research Executive Agency. So far, their role has been instrumental, 
addressing perceived shortcomings in the management of large research programmes and 
initiatives. Although in principle one could foresee a broader and more diverse set of functions 
for European research and innovation agencies, our scenarios describe a more nuanced and 
differentiated view of the role of agencies. In a context of budgetary restraint and a focus on the 
innovative capacity of firms, agencies remain an important instrument to deal with specialised 
activities playing a supportive role: European research funding for fundamental research is 
disbursed, as it is today, through the European Research Council. The only scenario that 
describes a role for European agencies does it within a rather constrained remit.  
Instead, Scenario 4 places attention on national and regional agencies. This scenario places the 
EU at the core of a European-wide effort to deal with the consequences of climate change; yet 
many of the relevant policies have to be implemented at the local and regional levels accounting 
for the specific local context of application. The flexibility that can be afforded by national and 
regional agencies fit an environment where the orientation function is performed at the European 
level, but national and sub-national actors play key roles in the programming and performing 
functions. This means a proliferation of smaller agencies with limited geographical scope and the 
EU playing a coordination role, supporting collaborative arrangements enabling systematic but 
distributed joined-action.  
In summary, agencies can play a role within narrowly defined policy areas, or narrowly defined 
geographical zones. The first alternative leads us to a situation that is not very different from 
today’s, while the second implies a proliferation of organisations and a focus on coordination 
activities for EU policy, further developing current instruments like ERA-Nets, Joint Programming 
Initiatives, and Article 185 initiatives.  
4.1.3 Civil Society Organisations 
All but one of our scenarios contemplates the growth in the research arena of Civil Society 
Organisations (foundations, NGOs, learned societies, university associations, etc.). Civil Society 
organisations are gaining influence within the policy processes and becoming an avenue of 
democratic representation. They are proposing research directions and starting to contribute to 
the programming and even performance of research. Our scenarios reflect this trend but also 
caution us that the functions they perform are not predetermined and can evolve into different 
directions, depending on the political context in which they operate. In a world led by private 
commercial interests and characterised by public sector penury (Scenario 1), private 
philanthropic organisations come to cover some of the gaps left by the reduction in public sector 
interventions; they use their financial capacity to fund programmes and are playing a crucial 
programming function. In Scenario 2, civil society organisations form part of a broader collection 
of public and private bodies that operate at various levels and who share in the performance of 
the wide array of publicly-funded research activities. In Scenario 4, groups concerned with 
environmental and related matters cover both programming and performing functions 
complementing the substantial effort driven by the public sector.  
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Although the role of Civil Society Organisations can therefore vary, the scenarios suggest that 
they will become a central set of actors to add to government institutions and private sector firms 
to conform the triad around which the definition, implementation and performance of Science, 
Technology and Innovation policies will revolve. This is a more complex world, a preview of 
which we can start to see today in sectors like biomedical research. Coordination to perform the 
orientation and programming functions has to extend beyond governmental organisation and the 
conditions under which organisations access funding may also have to adapt to the emergence 
of new performers carrying out their research within Civil Society Organisations. In other words 
they need to be engaged in more direct and operational ways than the common exhortations to 
the need for a “dialogue with society”.  
4.1.4 Conclusions relating to institutional issues 
We have seen how the role of the European Union and its institutions differs across scenarios; 
these differences will extend to the role played by institutions at national and regional level. The 
evolution of the balance among the different policy levels is subject to big uncertainties, and we 
cannot assume that the progression towards a certain model (say, an increased role for the 
European institutions) represents the natural evolution from the present situation. As we have 
seen in our scenario analysis, the regional level is, together with the local, the central locus of 
STI policy in scenario 3, and it is also important for the experimentation and eventual 
deployment of innovations in scenario 4. European institutions are dominant in scenario 2 and 
national government have retained a degree of influence and relevance against the general 
retrenchment of the State in scenario 1. There is therefore a choice among different institutional 
architectures and this choice is not neutral in relation to political objectives. For instance, a 
strong role for European institutions fits with a scenario in which national authorities have agreed 
to pursue a variety of societal goals requiring international coordination, but cannot be sustained 
by a scenario characterised by budgetary restriction in the public sector and a focus on private 
firms as the engine of competitiveness and economic growth.  
4.2 Policy priorities: the key role of R&I framework conditions 
An important (and somewhat unexpected) outcome of the process is the importance given by 
scenarios to framework conditions.  
It is noticeable that the scenarios have often pointed to the framework conditions of research 
and innovation as a key objective of STI policy rather than specifying research fields or 
objectives. Equally important, although framework conditions play a very important role in the 
scenarios, they do so in very different ways. These instruments are mobilised in support of 
knowledge generation and application, but the specific ways in which they do so differ 
depending on the dominant political outlook of every scenario.  
Framework conditions as highlighted in scenarios cover intellectual property rights, standards, 
and regulatory activity (focused on public procurement and on communications). IPR is 
prominent in scenario 1 as a condition for greater competitiveness of firms, and this scenario 
foresees the achievement of a full system covering ‘one stop shop’ for granting and a European-
level enforcement system (with a dedicated European court). Scenarios 2 and 4 are 
characterised by large public investments supporting new R&D directions to solve societal 
problems; here IP policies seek to ensure that the results of such research are publicly available. 
There are similar differences for standards where they serve the opening of markets for firms in 
scenario 1, while they are a critical instrument in scenario 4 to reduce the environmental impact 
of goods and services. There is yet another objective pursued in scenario 3 where European 
standards are there to make sure that local conditions and requirements are adhered to in 
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products manufactured “outside” (as in Scenario 3). Similar differences in focus apply for 
regulations surrounding procurement policies.  
To sum up, the scenarios have defined a set of policies setting up the framework conditions that 
are crucial for the future development of European societies (standards, IP, public procurement). 
These “framework conditions”, however, will be very different depending on the political context 
within which they operate, and which in turn they help shape. Although it is often seen as a pure 
technical matter, the scenarios have alerted us to the profoundly political nature of regulatory 
debates. 
4.3 Direct interventions 
Although the scenarios focused their policy attention on measures that were setting the 
framework conditions for R&D and for society at large, there was one sector that called for both 
regulatory interventions and direct interventions, and that appeared in more than two scenarios: 
the need to develop a comprehensive and efficient communications infrastructure. The wording 
covers both the traditional worlds of transport and telecommunications, but also the new word of 
internet-based interactions. Yet again, the relative importance of each, the balance between 
indirect and direct interventions, and the overall efforts required vary across scenarios. In 
scenario 1 the transfer of physical goods is anticipated to be a central concern, and without 
environmental issues playing a strong role in policy definition, efficient land, sea and air means 
of transport constitute a central element of this communication infrastructure. The perception of 
social challenges is likely to affect the notion of what can pass for an “efficient” mode of 
communication focusing more on telecommunications, internet ‘infrastructures’ and steering 
physical communications in directions that are perceived to be congruent with the need to 
address a variety of societal challenges. In scenario 3, we can expect an even more nuanced 
view of what constitutes a strong communication infrastructure with a clear focus on internet-
based interactions, and the conditions insuring the ability to develop a set of platforms for the 
exchange of experiences and practices among strong localities.  
The remaining direct interventions we noted in our scenarios were unique to each kind of 
scenario, sometimes even opposite. For instance, scenario 3 relied heavily on the exploitation of 
the existing scientific and technological base to support localities focused on the achievement of 
optimal welfare conditions for their citizens; in this context there were no additional direct 
interventions required in support of specific scientific and technological areas. In contrast, the 
pursuit of economic competitiveness focused the limited budgets available for public research on 
the conduct of frontier research and technology. Any investment that could in any way duplicate 
efforts or support research that may not result in substantial technological advances would be 
considered wasteful. Besides the limited availability of public funds will push many investments 
to be carried in partnership with the private sector. The spread of Public-Private Partnerships in 
research and technological development will require a redefinition of the competition rules; as 
private investors will seek assurances that their R&D investments will be rewarded through 
guaranteed access to sufficient markets for the resulting products and services. 
The way research is targeted under scenarios 2 and 4 is again different. Societal problems need 
the organization of research programmes that are system-oriented; that is, instead of focusing 
on the generation of new knowledge and expect that somehow this knowledge may be applied 
to address practical issues, the programmes see the application of new knowledge within a 
complex social system as one of the main challenges of research. This requires special attention 
to be paid to experimentation, real size demonstrators and “bottom-up” stakeholder participation. 
There are also differences between scenarios 2 and 4; while research programmes in scenario 4 
will target a narrower set of fields and be directly oriented to the search for specific solutions, 
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whereas in scenario 2 there is a wider set of challenges which may be amenable to the 
development of more progressive, longer-term solutions. 
4.4 Words of caution 
The policy lessons we have derived from our scenarios may disappoint the reader looking for a 
clear set of research objectives and priorities to be derived from a future-scanning exercise. Our 
scenarios have not produced such “solutions”. Instead of finding a convergence in the way 
problems were defined, and developing a consensual understanding of the long-term needs of 
society, our scenarios have highlighted profound differences in the political and social priorities 
that underpin such scenarios. Such differences result in varying understandings of the role of 
science and technology in society, and of the institutions involved in generating and applying 
new knowledge. This result has however specific implications for the current policy discussion 
on the future of the European Research Area. Some have already been discussed in this 
document but the diversity and even divergence in the way potential future societies might 
regard the role of science and technology warns us about the inadequacy of some implicit or 
explicit assumptions underpinning current Science and Technology and Innovation Policy 
(STIP). These assumptions need to be revisited recognising that STIP is profoundly political, and 
not a consensual ground in which societies converge led by the recognition of the importance of 
research in the new “knowledge society”.  
Some of the assumptions that are called into question are the following: 
 The assumption of: the promotion of excellence should be the natural overriding objective 
of research policy. In fact, except for Scenario 1, the highly selective ethos of this 
approach was not present in any of the other scenarios. The concern with systemic 
effects and the application of research to address societal problems were the overriding 
concern in two of the scenarios.  
 Universities should aspire to excellence by improving their research capacity and 
outputs. The role of universities and the balance between universities and RPOs varied 
across scenarios. This is a reflection of the different functions that universities play in our 
societies that are likely to continue to play in the future. Scenario 3 for instance focused 
on the local role of universities and their teaching function. 
 An integrated European R&D system is a precondition for more efficient and effective 
research systems. In many scenarios, however, integration is replaced by different forms 
of harmonization. Often the emphasis is placed on the understanding and fit with local 
conditions and in the development of capacities that can deal with the local and regional 
qualities of more general social challenges. 
 The crucial role of science in buttressing the knowledge society is widely acknowledged. 
Yet societal attitudes towards science are far from heterogeneous, and the achievement 
of scientific goals is often considered to be secondary to welfare and other social 
objectives. This illustrated, for instance, in the reduced role that science and technology 
investments play in Scenario 3. 
 Only strong top-down steering and priority setting will enable us to address global 
challenges. The scenarios show that may encounter some limitations if it is not 
complemented by bottom up elements. Orientation may need to span all levels.  
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5 Discussion and Conclusions 
The policy lensing approach has helped us go further with scenarios that were initially developed 
through desk research, expert engagement and a clear FTA scenario methodology.  By looking 
at these worlds from the view of (a) policy goals, (b) policy action spaces (in terms of functional 
layers) and (c) modes of Europeanisation, we have further developed and analysed the research 
and innovation worlds described in the four scenarios (here demonstrated for scenario 1). 
This further development enables a next step, the extraction of “Issues for policy discussion 
today”, when backcasting from these future worlds to today’s research and innovation choices.  
We have made this step in the VERA consortium, and the full text on “issues for policy 
discussion” is provided in section 4 of this paper.14  
The policy-lensing approach as we have described it, is not focused on building consistent 
scenario-worlds per se, but focuses on interpreting and fleshing out these worlds to inform policy 
decisions today.  This means the analyst undertaking policy lensing, retains the tools and skill 
sets of an FTA analyst whilst placing him or herself in a position of a policy shaper, applying 
various lenses.   
Between the authors of this paper, we have discussed whether the policy priorities and 
functional layers should have been included in the original scenarios.  We concluded, and 
suggest this to our readers, that the policy lensing expands on the raw scenarios in a very 
structured policy-oriented manner, drawing on theory to help us derive policy interpretations and 
conclusions; yet if we had constructed the scenarios guided by such policy frames these may 
have been more constrained and would not have explored plausible future contexts and 
developments in the way they now do.   We propose that there are two specific contributions of 
policy lensing as an independent activity after the development of policy endogenous scenarios: 
1. Policy practice oriented refinement i.e. fleshing out the scenarios with respect to 
relevant operational policy categories (lens 2). Interpreting the scenarios for the three 
layers provides a real added value as it bridges from the general policy factors to the 
operational lens of the policy context. This is something that cannot be done in the 
collective process of scenario building as it is not accessible to the non-policy 
participants. In short, it can be a further step in tailoring scenario output into usable 
intelligence for policy action. 
2. Normative Assessment i.e. assessing the scenarios vis-a-vis acknowledged policy 
goals of today. This is visible in lens 1. We feel that this approach yields very valuable 
insights like, for example, in the raw scenario where “challenge orientation” is no longer 
high on the policy agenda, through the lensing we could see that there is a potential for 
progress towards it.  
Both aspects are well in line with the notion of adaptive Foresight which suggests a special 
sense making phase for each actor group and in particular policy.  
 
                                               
14 Though this paper focuses on policy lensing as an approach, we think it important to show what sort of 
analysis can be made, once scenarios have been lensed.  This analysis is given in section 4, and covers 
all four scenarios.  In Box 0, we have provided summaries of the 4 scenarios, but for further details of the 
policy lensing of the four scenarios, you can find a working document at www.policy-lensing.com or you 
can go directly to the scenario report (see Teufel et al. 2013)  
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Finally, we argue that this positioning of the FTA analyst in the hot-seat of a policy shaper 
requires the development of “robust lenses”.  Our interest in this project was on the European 
research and innovation landscape and aspects of Europeanisation (cf. European Research 
Area).  But of course, other lenses might be developed for exploring scenarios from a policy 
shaper perspective other than that relating to research and innovation (for example in national or 
international sustainability policies, energy, transport etc.). 
What is key, is that the lenses are constructed in a systematic and transparent way. In this short 
paper, we hope to have provided an insight into this policy lensing approach and philosophy, 
and we offer it as a potential next step to further enable the uptake of FTA intelligence into policy 
oriented intelligence. 
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